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Kirjoittaessani on helmikuu 2020, vain muutama päivä siitä, kun Britannia historiallisesti poistui Euroopan 
Unionista. Päätös poistua Euroopan Unionista oli Britanniassa kesällä 2016 järjestetyn kansanäänestyksen 
tulos. Britannian poistuminen EU:sta on nimeltään Brexit, joka tarkoittaa sitä, että vuoden 2020 loppuun 
mennessä Britannia ei ole enää Euroopan Unionin jäsen. Brexit on aiheuttanut epävarmuutta ja haastanut 
erityisesti EU-kansalaisten kuuluvuutta Britanniaan. Tämän tutkielman tavoitteena oli selvittää, miten 
Britanniassa asuvat suomalaiset konstruoivat kuulumistaan ja kuulumattomuuttaan Britanniaan tammikuussa 
2019, vain paria kuukautta ennen kuin Britannian oli alun perin määrä poistua Euroopan Uniosta. 
 
Keräsin tutkimuksen aineiston suljetun Facebook-ryhmän kautta E-lomake-kyselyllä, johon vastasi viikon 
aikana 194 Britanniassa asuvaa tai hiljattain asunutta suomalaista. Koska akateemista tutkimusta 
suomalaisten Brexit kokemuksista ei ollut, pyrin rakentamaan kyselylomakkeen avoimesti ilman johdattelevia 
kysymyksiä. Usea vastaaja puhui kuuluvuutensa menetyksestä Brexitin vuoksi, kun taas osa totesi, ettei ollut 
niinkään omasta asemastaan huolissaan. Tämän vuoksi valitsin aineistomenetelmäksi diskurssianalyysin, joka 
mahdollistaa ihmisten erilaiset tavat puhua asioista. Diskurssianalyysi on metodin lisäksi myös teoreettinen 
viitekehys ja se perustuu sosiaalisen konstruktionismin traditioon, jossa ihmiset nähdään kielen avulla 
rakentamassa sosiaalista todellisuuttaan. Diskurssianalyysi tutkii ihmisten kielen käyttöä tekemisenä, jolla 
pyritään saavuttamaan asioita. Tutkielman teoreettisena viitekehyksenä toimii kieli toiminnallisena, kulttuuriin 
ja kontekstiin sidonnaisen asiana ja erityisenä taustateoriana toimii diskursiivinen näkökulma kuulumiseen, 
johon liittyvät vahvasti kategorisoinnin, toiseuttamisen ja identiteetin käsitteet.  
 
Tutkimuskysymykseni oli: Minkälaisia kuulumisen ja kuulumattomuuden diskursseja aineiston suomalaiset 
konstruoivat Brexit Britanniassa. Lisäksi kysyin, minkälaisia funktioita näillä diskursseilla on ja minkälaisia 
identiteettejä ne rakentavat. Nostin aineistosta neljä diskurssia: kuulumattomuus, aktiivinen ulossulkeminen, 
toiseuttaminen ja ansaitsevuus. Diskurssit konstruoivat joko kuulumista tai kuulumattomuutta ja rakensivat 
joko vastustavia ja lohduttomia tai hyväksyviä ja joustavia identiteettejä.  Tutkielman tulokset osoittavat, miten 
Brexit ilmiönä haastaa aineiston suomalaiset uudelleenmäärittelemään kuulumistaan Britanniaan. Brexit on 
ilmiö, jossa kuka tahansa voi joutua epävarmuuden tilaan poliittisten, sosiaalisten ja diskursiivisten 
kamppailujen ristiaallokossa. 
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At the time of writing, it is February 2020, only days after Britain historically left the European Union. The 
decision to leave the European Union was an outcome of a referendum on EU membership in June 2016. 
Britain’s withdrawal from the EU is called Brexit, which means that by the end of 2020, Britain will no longer 
be a full member of the European Union. Brexit has caused uncertainty and challenged especially EU nationals 
belonging to Britain. The objective of this study was to analyse how Finns living in Britain constructed different 
belonging and non-belonging discourses in January 2019. Just over two months before Britain was supposedly 
leaving the European Union in the first place. 
 
I gathered the data for this thesis via Facebook through an online Brexit-questionnaire made by myself. During 
the data gathering, there was no previous academic research of Finnish people’s Brexit experiences. Thus I 
built a half-open, half structured questionnaire. Between January the 8th and 15th 194 Finnish participants had 
answered my questionnaire. Many talked about a loss of belonging to Britain, and others discussed why they 
mainly were not that worried. Due to the variety of the answers, I chose discourse analysis as the method, for 
it permits people even in similar positions to speak differently about a topic. Discourse analysis examines the 
contextual use of language. The theoretical starting point was language being performative, cultural and bound 
to a specific time in history. I chose a discursive approach to belonging to discuss how people before had used 
their language to construct belonging and non-belonging. Also, the concepts of categorisation, othering, and 
identity are essential. 
 
The research question I asked was: what kind of belonging and non-belonging discourses do Finns construct 
in Brexit Britain. Additionally, I wondered what functions these discourses had and what kind of identities they 
constituted. The four discourses I found were: non-belongingness, active exclusion, othering, and 
deservingness. These discourses either constructed a loss of belonging or a sense of belonging to Britain. 
They also constituted either identities of resistance and hopelessness or identities of acceptance and 
resilience. The study illuminated how Brexit had made the Finnish participants renegotiate their belonging to 
Britain. Brexit is a phenomenon under which anyone seen as a stranger or someone from somewhere else 
could be constructed as the Other. 
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1.Introduction 
Over three years ago in June 2016, a small majority of British electorates voted to leave the 
European Union (EU) in a Referendum on EU membership (cf. Goodwin & Heath 2016, 323; Clarke, 
Goodwin & Whiteley 2017, 439). This process of Britain supposedly leaving the EU by the end of 
March 2019 was named Brexit, literally referring to Britain exiting the EU. Ever since the vote, the 
lengthiness and unclearness of Brexit have become causes of worry for many. Above all, millions of 
non-British EU citizens have been affected by the Brexit uncertainty and their future in Britain. The 
purpose of this master’s thesis is not only to try and understand the process of Brexit but most of 
all, to give voice to Finnish nationals living in Britain. These Finnish nationals, among other non-
British EU nationals, were excluded throughout the Referendum debate by having their right to vote 
denied (Tyrrell et al. 2019, 2).  
Numerous surveys conducted (cf. Lulle, Morosanu & King 2018; Manners 2018; Guma & Dafydd 
Jones 2019) have acknowledged that the EU Referendum was above all a vote on the attitudes 
towards immigration, rather than towards the European Union. Many Brits living in other EU 
member states feel a loss of belonging to their nation due to Brexit (Higgins 2019). Similarity, 
research findings are suggesting that Brexit is a threat towards the rights of EU migrants and their 
participation, settlement and belonging to Britain (cf. Guma & Dafydd Jones 2019, 2; Ranta & 
Nancheva 2019, 4). Even though some studies on EU citizens in Brexit Britain haven been done (cf. 
ch.2), the need for more research has been recognised (cf. Guma & Dafydd Jones 2019; Ranta & 
Nancheva 2019; Tyrrell et al. 2019). This thesis aims to bring some. 
While writing this thesis, many people have asked me what is it that Brexit actually means. I find it 
difficult to answer the question as Brexit can certainly mean many things to different individuals, 
but above all, because Brexit does not have a clear definition yet. For, no one knows how Britain will 
leave the EU, under what circumstances, or whether leaving at all. This thesis emphasises that Brexit 
can be constructed in multiple ways, depending on who you ask, when, where and under what 
circumstances. I asked Finnish people living in Britain how they felt about Brexit at the beginning of 
last year (8 – 15.1.2019). 
Without previous examples due to the topic being so current, I put up an online questionnaire 
(appendix 1) in a closed Facebook group for Finns living in Britain with multiple questions broadly 
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about experiences towards the Referendum result, uncertainties of Brexit and some background 
questions. Using a data-oriented analysis, I found these Finnish respondents very often stating that 
they were not welcome in Britain anymore immediately after the result of the Referendum in 2016. 
However, not everyone was feeling unwelcome but quite the contrary. Therefore, I chose discourse 
analysis as the method of analysis, for it allows various ways of speaking about a topic, also 
recognising the temporal uniqueness of the different ways people speak in. Discourse analysis 
argues that language does not only describe but is also a process of doing something (Potter & 
Wetherell 1987, 6). Discourse analysis is based on the tradition of social constructionism which 
argues that the world is socially constructed through language and could also be constructed in 
different ways, allowing for different world views to take place (cf. Gergen 2009; Burr 2015; Jokinen, 
Juhila & Suoninen 2016). I built a research question to complement the data and method of analysis 
such as follows: What kind of belonging and non-belonging discourses do Finns construct in Brexit 
Britain? The focus is on how these Finns talk about their belonging in Brexit Britain and what are the 
functions of their discourses. 
The method of this thesis is a qualitative one, and I will begin Chapter two by going more into detail 
in the process of Brexit, including reasons behind the Referendum result and on the Referendum 
itself. Secondly, in Chapter three, I will present the background theory of this thesis which is a 
discursive perspective on how through language people construct belonging. The concepts 
of identity, othering and categorisation are essential. Next, in Chapter five and six, I will discuss the 
study design and chosen method of analysis in more detail. In what follows, I will present the 
empirical findings in Chapter seven. In Chapter eight, I will discuss an overview of the findings. Lastly, 
in Chapter nine, I will conclude with a discussion on the researcher’s position in more detail, 
including ethical considerations with limitations and suggestions for further research. 
2.Brexit 
There is no clear definition for Brexit (yet). Thus I approach it through a discursive view, highlighting 
the multiple different ways it could be spoken about. Combining previous rather new research on 
Brexit, I come up with a brief definition of the different phases Brexit has gone through. After this, I 
will present a brief overview of the meaning of the European Union (EU) and Britain’s more or less 
unique role in it since 1973. I will present research on both the voting patterns in the 2016 
Referendum as well as possible reasons behind the voting result, in the upcoming section. The 
Chapter will continue by claiming that it is the rise of right-wing populism not just in Britain, but 
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other Western countries also (cf. Wodak 2015; Virdee & McGeever 2018), that has caused Brexit 
ever to become a reality. Lastly, I will conclude the Chapter with some studies conducted on EU 
nationals and Brexit.  
It was Britain’s Prime Minister at the time, David Cameron, who put up the Referendum in June 
2016 regarding Britain’s position in the European Union. The motive behind the Referendum was to 
bargain a better deal for Britain in the EU. In result of the Referendum, a small majority (51,9% to 
48, 1) of British electorates historically voted in favour of Britain leaving the European Union by the 
end of March 2019. (cf. Hobolt 2016; Goodwin & Heath 2016, 323; Clarke et al. 2017, 439.) Ever 
since the vote, the politicians and decision-makers of Britain have worked hard in terms of figuring 
out what kind of a relationship Britain will have with the EU in the future. From the very start, there 
were roughly three ways of delivering Brexit: either through a no-deal1 scenario, a deal2, or 
cancelling Brexit (which could happen through another referendum, a general election or shift in 
British politics).  In short, it has been difficult for the British parliament to accept a deal that is worse 
than the current relationship between Britain and the EU. Nevertheless, for the unity of the EU, it is 
crucial not to give a withdrawing state a better deal than they already have as a member. (De Vries 
2018, 11.) Thus, any outcome seems to be worse off for someone, adding to this that Britain is living 
under very divided times. Some even argue that never in history has Britain been this divided 
(Goodwin & Heath 2016, 331).  
 
Cameron himself was in favour of staying in the EU and had even campaigned to Remain (Koller, 
Kopf & Miglbauer 2019, 5). Hence, after the Referendum result was clear, Cameron was forced to 
resign and give way to Britain’s next Prime Minister: Theresa May. May fought to deliver Brexit for 
over two years and did come up with a 585-page-deal that the remaining 27 member states of the 
EU agreed on. However, the British Parliament voted this deal down three times. In result, Britain 
did not withdraw from the EU according to the plan by the end of March 2019. Due to the British 
Parliament not willing to leave without a deal, hold another Referendum, nor accept May’s deal 
either, she had to ask for an extension of article 503 from the remaining EU member states. After 
lengthy negotiations, Britain was admitted a new leave date by the end of October 2019. (cf. BBC 
News 2019; Euronews 2019a.) May did not succeed in her task and was also forced to resign, giving 
way to Britain’s next Prime Minister: Boris Johnson since 23rd of July 2019. Johnson’s most important 
mission would be to deliver Brexit.  
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Nevertheless, Britain did not withdraw from the EU during the end of October either. Johnson had 
to also ask for an extension of article 50 from the other EU member states. This time a new leave 
date was set to the end of January 2020 and a general election date was decided for the 12th of 
December 2019. As a result of the election, Johnson’s Conservative party won by a majority which 
would mean that very likely Britain will leave the European Union by the end of 2020. (Euronews 
2019b.) The British parliament and the EU have accepted Johnsons’ withdrawal deal which includes 
a transition period until the end of the year 2020. During which the relations between Britain and 
the EU will remain the same. The agenda of this transition period is to negotiate the future terms 
and relations between Britain and the other EU member states. 
 
I argue that Britain’s last year’s general election result in a way was a sign of people being fed up 
with Brexit and wanted it over and done with, whether or not agreeing with Britain withdrawing 
from the EU. The Conservative party was the only party (among the Brexit party) who still since 
summer 2016 was very much in favour of Britain withdrawing from the European Union.  
 
2.1 Britain in the European Union 
To understand what it means for a member state to withdraw from the European Union, it is 
important to understand what the European Union means. Broadly speaking the European Union is 
something between a nation-state and an international organisation consisting of (still) 28 liberal-
democratic member states sharing common values (Cini & Perez-Solorzano Borragan 2016, 3). Some 
(Bomberg, Peterson & Corbett 2012, 224) argue that the EU is exceptional, challenging and unique 
in many ways, for it allows member states to hold most of their sovereignty. In addition, national 
governments are permitted to maintain their power (Pinder & Usherwood 2013, 6). 
 
 The EU is built on four freedoms of movement: goods, services, capital and persons; known as EU 
citizen’s rights (McCown 2006, 178). In result, EU member states have given up their right to decide 
who is entitled to cross their borders, which is one of the fundamental rights of nations. For people, 
the free movement means that EU citizens can move within the Union from one country to another 
to live and work under the same conditions as locals. Thus, intra-EU migration can be understood 
as different and more privileged than traditional movement coming from outside Europe, for EU 
migrants are entitled to equal treatment. In result, EU migrants should basically not experience 
discrimination. (Koikkalainen 2013, 86, 88.) 
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The European Economic Community (EEC4) that later became the EU was established in 1958 by six 
states: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Italy (cf. Bomberg et al. 2012, 
76 – 77; Pinder & Usherwood 2013, 1 – 2). The idea of a more united and integrated Europe 
stemmed from the traumatic experiences Europe had gone through during the two brutal World 
Wars. Albeit peace was at the heart of a more united Europe, soon also a large common market 
became important. (Cini & Perez-Solorzano Borragan 2016, 1 – 2, 65.) Before Britain joined the EEC, 
her membership application was vetoed twice by France, the first time in 1963, followed by a 
rejection in 1967 (Miglbauer & Koller 2019, 87). Finally, in 1973, Britain was accepted as part of the 
EEC after the resignation of French President de Gaulle in 1969 (Pinder & Usherwood 2013, 19). 
Britain’s relationship with the European Union has been referred to as uneasy and complicated ever 
since joining the EEC with multiple opt-outs and renegotiations (Miglbauer & Koller 2019, 87; Koller 
et al. 2019, 2). 
  
The World Wars never defeated Britain as it did the founding states of the Community. Like most 
other EU member states, Britain differed in a way, that she never joined the Schengen, which is the 
ultimate removal of borders (Pinder & Usherwood 2013, 105, 107). Moreover, Britain is not part of 
the common currency EURO. Thus from the start deciding to have a more significant say in her 
immigration and monetary policy than most other members of the EU. I argue that in a way Britain 
was in a position that she did not have to fully participate like the founders and most members since 
did, not been defeated by the World Wars but also due to possessing one of Europe’s biggest 
economies and populations.  
 
It must also be recognised that Britain has played a significant and important role in Europe and can 
be understood as one of the main shapers of it (Gibbins 2014, 4) throughout history. Nevertheless, 
Britain’s first referendum as member of the EEC was held on the fifth of June in 1975 when Britain 
had been a member for less than two years. It was also the first nationwide referendum held in 
British history. At the time, 67% wanted to remain as part of the European Economic Community, 
during a time when Britain was struggling with recession and high unemployment. (Butler & 
Kitzinger 1976, 1.) 
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In conclusion, if a country leaves the EU without any kind of a deal, it loses its four freedoms of 
movement. As mentioned earlier, especially non-British EU citizens in Britain, as well as British 
citizens on the Continent, are experiencing uncertainty over their current positions and their lives 
(Gietel-Basten 2016, 673). These people have been challenged to consider whether they have a right 
to stay in the host country or not if losing the four freedoms. Thus, Brexit must be understood as a 
phenomenon that has created uncertainty among British people and other EU nationals. Millions of 
non-British EU citizens live in Britain and vice versa over a million British citizens live in other 
member states enjoying the freedom of movement empowered by the European Union. Next, I will 
present research on the 2016 Referendum. 
 
2.2 The Referendum  
A referendum is a direct popular vote with a simple yes/no answer option, and it can be either 
binding or advisory. In January 2013 David Cameron promised in his Bloomberg speech (Bloomberg 
speech, 2013) the people of Britain a referendum on EU membership if the Conservative party 
would be re-elected (Koller et al. 2019, 5). The 2016 Referendum was an advisory vote asking 
whether Britain should remain as a member of the European Union or not. The Referendum result 
was a surprise for polls had forecasted most British electorates to vote to stay in the European 
Union. (cf. Virdee & McGeever 2018, 1803; Koller et al. 2019, 2.) Not even three years later is there 
a clarification what voting no meant. Moreover, referendums, in general, have been widely criticised 
as inaccurate ways of dealing with politics (cf. Wiberg 2011, 53).  
Broadly speaking Wales and England voted Leave, whereas Scotland, London and Northern Ireland 
were more in favour of Remaining (Goodwin & Heath 2016, 323). Nevertheless, not all areas in 
Wales or England (besides London) voted to leave, or all areas in Scotland or Northern Ireland voted 
to remain. There were differences in voting patterns among different towns and cities. The turnout 
of the 2016 Referendum was as high as 72%, which meant that over 33 million British citizens took 
part in the democratic decision-making process. (Goodwin & Heath 2016, 325.) There was a clear 
division in voting patterns among age groups, for 62% of 24-34-year-olds voted Remain as in 60% of 
aged 65 and over voted Leave (Virdee & McGeever 2018, 1803).  
Age can be seen to have played a role in the Referendum outcome, but so can education. For, 
typically, areas less educated than average, were more in favour of voting Leave than Remain 
(Goodwin & Heath 2016, 325). These results are not per se surprising as younger, educated and 
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higher earners are typically more in favour of the European Union, because of their higher value 
towards the freedom of movement provided by the EU (Ashcroft & Bevir 2016, 356). These people 
value the freedom of movement because they have the resources to use it. Education may, i.e. help 
with language skills and financial independence may ease affording to move into another country. 
Above all, however; it has been recognised that economically less off than average areas would vote 
to leave with the left-behind working-class (Goodwin & Heath 2016, 325). Since the Brexit vote, 
academics have acknowledged Britain to be a divided nation with winners and losers of 
globalisation. Or in everyday language; it has been suggested that the Brexit result stemmed from 
economic inequalities in Britain. Those who have seemed to benefit the least out of globalisation or 
deeper European integration tended to vote Leave rather than Remain. (De Vries 2018, 17.)  
 Under the Conservative rule, income inequality in Britain has become one of the highest in the 
whole of Europe and especially the ideology of austerity introduced by the Conservatives in 2010 
has affected this. The June 2016 Referendum meant that Britain had experienced austerity for six 
years. In result, many British electorates felt impoverished and vulnerable towards the extreme 
slogans of simple solutions such as making Great Britain great again. (Manners 2018, 1225 – 1226.) 
Working-class economic and social needs were seen not to have been met by the government 
(Gough 2017, 367). These left-behind social groups filled with insecurity, pessimism and 
marginalisation, felt as though the elites either in Brussels or Westminster were not sharing their 
values or representing their interests (Goodwin & Heath 2016, 331). Thus, they voted against 
Brussels where the EU headquarter is located and against Westminster where the British political 
headquarter is.  
However, Euroscepticism is not only found among those who have suffered due to globalisation but 
also among those who are well off. Suggesting that these people are in such a position that they can 
afford to believe they will do even better on their own. (De Vries 2018, 6.) Britain was suffering due 
to recession 40 years ago during the first referendum on EU membership, which in a way may 
suggest why so many at the time believed Britain needed the Union. De Vries (2018) gives an 
example of Bournemouth, which is economically doing well and where unemployment is very low. 
Yet still, a majority voted to leave the European Union. Suggesting that intra-EU migration annoys 
some and Eurosceptic are primarily those who see their own national identity as superior over other 
nationalities, versus those transnationally mobile people who have, i.e. lived in other EU member 
states. (De Vries 2018, 15, 18 – 19.)  
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Public polls in Britain during the end of 2015 showed that people’s opinion on the most pressing 
issue Britain was facing was immigration which was simply by the majority seen as too high. 
Especially after the Eastern European Union enlargement in 2004, when ten new member states 
joined the EU, Britain had faced an increasing amount of immigration from Eastern and Central 
member states. Also, the 2015 refugee crisis which the EU was facing shred public anxiety over 
migration. (Clarke et al. 2017, 11 – 12.) Suggesting that many people were in a way turning to their 
own national identity and wanted to empower that detriment to immigration. However, rather 
surprising is according to the quantitative study by Goodwin & Heath (2016, 328 – 329), that areas 
where there was the fewest recent EU migration, were the most likely to vote to leave the EU. Albeit 
regions with a rather high amount of EU migration tended to vote Remain, areas that had 
experienced a sudden increase in EU migration specifically over the last ten years voted Leave. The 
results suggest that especially sudden changes in population create concern about immigration. 
(ibid.) 
 
 Therefore, membership of the European Union can, raise the question of sovereignty and for some 
be a national question. After all, we mustn’t forget that Britain was a leading empire still 150 years 
ago and especially some older Britons still maintain an imperial consciousness. (Condor & Fenton 
2012, 386 – 387.) Additionally, Englishness has been found to be an essential motivator to vote 
Leave instead of Remain, people who stated themselves as English over British (Virdee & McGeever 
2018, 1809). On the contrary, those who reported themselves as being Welsh tended to vote 
Remain more often than those who had a Welsh and British identity (Guma & Dafydd Jones 2019, 
3). This is an exciting finding suggesting that Welsh nationalities did not necessarily vote Leave more 
often than Remain, even though as an area Wales was in favour of Leaving.  
Next, I aim to show how Brexit was brought forth with the use of right-wing populist rhetoric.  
2.3 Right-wing Populism 
I argue among many scholars (cf. Koller et al. 2019) that the Referendum result was above all a result 
of the rise of right-wing populism in Britain. Populism, as a political approach is not a new 
phenomenon (Wodak et al. 2013). It is highlighted especially as a modern phenomenon which can 
be found widely around the world but most prevalently in the European and American democracies 
(Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, 21). Populism has different definitions and approaches as it may 
have various forms during different times and places (cf. Canovan 1981, 7; Taggart 2000, 5). 
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Populism can come from either side of politics left or right. Still, especially right-wing populism uses 
anti-immigration, xenophobia and anti-EU rhetoric. Broadly speaking the definition is also between 
some form of socialism combined with the left-wing populists and some sort of nationalism 
combined with the right-wing populists. In Europe, populism was a force that arose against, i.e. the 
frustrations over European integration and immigration in the form of populist radical right parties. 
(Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, 17 – 18, 21, 34.) Additionally, populism arose as a reaction 
against the dominance of particular parties of government (Taggart 2000, 73).  
Right-wing populist parties have been on the rise in many European Union countries and can be 
found all around Western democracies (cf. Gidron & Hall 2017, 57; Virdee & McGeever 2018, 1802; 
Koller et al. 2019, 3). Hence, in Europe, populism is mostly right-wing (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 
2017, 37). Thus, I also talk about right-wing populism among Brexit. Even though there are different 
forms of right-wing populist parties (Wodak 2015, 2) to distinguish their differences is not essential 
for this study. Hence, I will only broadly speak about right-wing populism.  
Among all definitions, the main idea in populism is the division of society between the homogenous 
good the people and the corrupt evil elite. Populism is an ideology that demands politics to express 
and speak the language of ordinary people. Especially the political establishment and most people 
who hold leading positions within, i.e. politics are seen to be part of the corrupt elite. Thus, in a way, 
populism could be understood as a democratising force, for it aims to represent those who have 
been unheard in society by the political establishment. However, a fundamental issue in populism 
is that it treats equally only those who are seen to be part of the people. Those who are seen to not 
belong to the people are treated differently. Thus, anyone who is seen as allegedly not being part of 
the homogenous people can be mistreated. (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, 6 – 7, 11 – 12, 18.) 
Populists argue that no one else can represent the people besides them. Therefore, anyone who 
does not support populist parties may be excluded from the morally pure people. (Wiberg 2011, 12; 
Muller 2016, 3.) 
2016 is recognised by many as a year of increasing uncertainty due to the rise of populism in the 
West. The two primary examples of the growth of populism are precisely Britain’s Referendum 
result to leave the European Union, and in a consecutive election, Donald Trump winning the 
presidential elections of America. (Croucher 2004, 1 – 2.) Moreover, if any other EU member state 
was to give out a Referendum on EU membership in 2016, a similar outcome could have possibly 
happened. Nevertheless, anti-EU rhetoric is not a new phenomenon in Britain. The United Kingdom 
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Independence Party (UKIP), ever since it was founded in 1993, has campaigned for Britain to leave 
the EU (Koller et al. 2019, 7). The anti-immigration discourse used especially between 2013 and 
2016 stirs up a sense of public uncertainty and growing anxiety over xenophobic attitudes setting 
up the agenda for the day of the Referendum (Cap 2019, 69). The core action plan of the UKIP was 
to promote less or no EU membership in addition to more freedom and less or no immigration in 
addition to less unemployment and more Britishness (Wodak 2015, 35).  
In the 2016 Referendum there were two primary campaigns Leave and Remain, the former 
campaigning in favour and the latter campaigning against Brexit (Manners 2018, 1215). The Leave 
campaign used right-wing populist rhetoric and put immigration under the red light and slogans 
such as take back control, stood out from the public debate (Koller et al. 2019, 7). Right-wing 
populist rhetoric is exclusive towards strangers such as minorities and migrants, who are not seen 
as part of the people, with the overall motto: “we have to defend ourselves against them” (Wodak 
2015, 20 – 21). Immigrants were blamed for reasons such as the lack of jobs and poor wages. 
Politicians know there are pros and cons to immigration; however, populists tend to highlight the 
cons with immigrants’ contributions being absent. (Gietel-Basten 2016, 673 – 674, 678; Gough 2017, 
367.) Manners (2018, 1215) argues that the campaigning behind the Referendum was between 
Remain reasoning why being a member of the EU is useful versus Leave being emotive, influencing 
people’s emotions (ibid).  
 
Hostility towards migrants in Europe is on the increase, and they are being positioned in discourse 
as the new Other. The mainstream political discourse, such as media and political parties, are 
normalising othering on all levels of discussion. (Delanty, Wodak & Jones, 2011, 1.) The populist 
rhetoric of the Leave campaign in Britain was above all about nationality and borders to protect 
one’s nation from other nationalities. The 2015 refugee crisis was presented personally as Britain 
under attack. Adding to the anti-immigration rhetoric, a government that was committed to 
austerity, meant, that population growth was understood as the leading cause of a continued need 
for austerity. (Gietel-Basten 2016, 678.) In conclusion, right-wing populism arises as a solution to 
the failure of current parties in power to sort out acute social problems (Wodak 2015, 21).  
 
Moreover, right-wing populism is not only a special form of rhetoric but also about specific content. 
The aim is to construct fear towards real or imagined dangerous scapegoats who are then blamed 
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for threatening and damaging societies. Right-wing populist rhetoric uses such as historical 
narratives and specific moral positions to legitimise othering. (Wodak 2015, 1, 6.) Therefore, 
anybody whether being the governing parties, foreigners etc. can potentially be constructed as the 
dangerous Other. However, the boundaries built in between us and the other, have been socially 
constructed over time; thus, they are doomed to change. (Wodak 2015, 4; Strani & Szczepaniak -
Kozak 2018, 166.)  
 
As stated above, there were different reasons why a phenomenon like Brexit became a reality in the 
first place. However, it has been evident that right-wing populism has been on the rise and was a 
key player among the Leave campaign campaigning to leave the European Union (cf. Koller et. al 
2019). Arguably austerity had made people feel worse off. Still, it was the right-wing populist 
rhetoric that constructed foreigners and migrants as the undesirable Other who were to blame for 
the problems of Britain. It was immigration that was a central issue in the EU Referendum (cf. Lulle 
et al. 2018; Manners 2018; Guma & Dafydd Jones 2019) but next I will specify that especially EU 
nationals were put under the red light.  
2.4 EU Nationals and Brexit  
Specifically, EU migration was a central issue in the EU Referendum. The Leave campaign used anti-
immigration discourse to blame the freedom of movement within EU member states 
causing uncontrolled mass immigration and problems in Britain. (Rzepnikowska 2019, 67.) In result, 
EU migrants became constructed as scapegoats, blamed for unemployment and overall 
dissatisfaction, threatening the British culture (Wodak 2011, 64). In a way, it was European migrants 
who were becoming the new Other (Rzepnikowska 2019, 70). Thus, I argue that especially European 
Union migrants were challenged to renegotiate their belonging to Britain after the Referendum 
result. Particularly the political discourses in the British media have paid little attention to the 
Referendum’s impact on EU migrants and their belonging to Britain after Brexit (cf. Ryan 2018, 234; 
Guma & Dafydd Jones 2019, 2).  
Although the outcome of Brexit could significantly impact the lives of non-British EU citizens in 
Britain, they were not allowed to vote (except the Irish) and through that have any influence on the 
Referendum result (Lulle et al. 2018, 3).  Local and sometimes even national elections allow for EU 
nationals with settled status to vote, however; the Brexit Referendum was strictly for people with 
British (or Irish) citizenship (Tyrrell et al. 2019, 2). Tyrrell et al. (2019, 2) refer to the migration report 
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published by Office for National Statistics (ONS) in 2017, that EU nationals in Britain do not often 
have British citizenship by their own choice or because it is a costly and complicated process. In 
addition to apply for citizenship, one has had to have lived in Britain for at least five years. 
Hence arguably, the Referendum was constructed as a British-only matter, a matter of British 
national identity, in which the EU nationals “found themselves powerless spectators in the vote 
which decided their future – as EU nationals living in a soon to be a non-EU country” (Tyrrell et al. 
2019, 2). I claim that it is the exclusion of EU migrants from voting in the EU Referendum that in the 
first place begun a process of othering. The othering legitimised active exclusion towards EU 
migrants. In result, just four days after the Referendum, hate crime against foreigners in Britain had 
risen 57% compared to the same time a year before. Surprisingly, post-referendum racism was 
aimed at anyone foreign or seen as the Other. (Komaromi 2016, 5.) Virdee & McGeever (2018, 1808) 
found striking about the increase in racist violence, that it was indicated at anyone seemingly an 
outsider whether being a black, brown or a white European migrant. The toxicity of the outcome of 
the Referendum deepened the recent trend, suggesting that both political and everyday life 
discourse had normalised the use of racism, especially towards racialised minorities. (Virdee & 
McGeever 2018, 1811.)   
A recent study by Tyrrell et al. (2019) examined Eastern European 1.5 migrant generation 
experiences of Brexit with a specific interest in the sense of belonging to Brexit Britain and young 
people’s future plans. The results showed that for participants what it meant to belong to Britain 
was under deconstruction due to Brexit. They found a typical in-betweenness among the 
participants, which lead to various feelings of belonging and non-belonging through different 
national identities. Many wanted to remain in Britain, and many also felt the need to plan a future 
somewhere else. The study illuminated how Brexit uncertainty has challenged Central and Eastern 
European young people’s right to belong to Britain. (Tyrrell et al. 2019, 1 – 5, 8 – 9.) Rzepnikowska 
(2019) examined Polish migrant women’s pre- and post-Referendum experiences of racism and 
xenophobia. The study found that the participants’ privilege of whiteness disappeared as soon as 
they started talking, for their accent made them as the Other. (Rzepnikowska 2019, 72 – 74.) These 
findings are suggesting that having an accent from somewhere else is enough to be othered as 
different from the mainstream.  
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In their study, Guma & Dafydd Jones (2019) examined interviews conducted on EU nationals living 
in Wales during and after the Referendum. The results highlight that Brexit had an impact on EU 
migrants’ sense of belonging and identity. The findings revealed that not just Eastern European 
participants had experienced hostility or violence but, i.e. also Portuguese nationals. In addition to 
personal hostility, through media coverage, participants knew hostility towards migrants had 
increased due to the Referendum. An important finding was also specific vulnerable groups such as 
unemployed or disabled people who had built their lives to Britain, for whom onward migration was 
not possible. For these people returning to their origin country or some other country is simply not 
an option. (Guma & Dafydd Joness 2019, 4 – 5, 8.) 
 
Zontini & Pero (2019) examined especially Italian national children and parents living in Britain. 
Majority of the respondents were EU nationals, and a minority were also British due to having a 
British parent. The findings suggest that multiple belonging had become harder due to Brexit for the 
respondents. Even the respondents with dual citizenship were experiencing rupture to their 
belonging. (Zontini & Pero 2019, 8 – 12.) Ranta & Nancheva (2019) also examined EU migrant pre- 
and post-Referendum experiences. Their findings were similar to the previous studies; Brexit had 
disrupted EU nationals’ belonging to Britain. From their data, respondents had begun constructing 
shared collective European identities. Likewise, with Tyrrell et al. (2019), they found an in-
betweenness the participants used to both identify with origin and host community. (Ranta & 
Nancheva 2019, 4 – 5, 8.)  
 
Belonging within EU migrants has not been the priority of academics until recently. Perhaps there 
has not been a need to because as outlined above, EU migration is different from traditional 
migration from third countries. (Ranta & Nancheva 2019, 2.) I had not asked about belonging in my 
Brexit-questionnaire (appendix 1), yet it was a theme that arose, and thus I began analysing it from 
my data. Belonging becomes crucial for my work the moment I recognise that right-wing populists 
who campaigned in favour of Brexit were challenging and asking who belongs to the country. Thus, 
it is not necessarily Brexit itself, but the way it has (and here in this thesis specifically) been 
constructed as an issue which influences EU migrants’ belonging to Britain. Right-wing populism 
challenged who belongs to us and who are the Others that don’t belong. Also, mainstream politics 
in Britain challenged belonging when it excluded non-British EU nationals from voting (in the 
Referendum) and talked about it only as a British matter. I am not suggesting that the Referendum 
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result made all people feel less belonging to Britain. Instead, I argue that specifically EU migrants 
were challenged to renegotiate their belonging. 
3. How is Language Used to Construct Belonging   
In this Chapter, I provide the theoretical framework of this work. 
 
An interest of this thesis has been to examine the way Brexit has been constructed as a phenomenon 
that has the potential to affect particularly EU citizens’ sense of belonging. However, the main aim 
of this thesis is to examine the belonging discourses Finns living in Britain constructed in January 
2019 when answering my online Brexit-questionnaire. As this is a discursive work, both social 
constructionism as well as discourse analysis, serve as the broad theoretical frameworks of this 
thesis. I will discuss both in more detail in Chapter six. Nevertheless in short; language is understood 
as doing something instead of being only descriptive and is part of the formation of our social reality 
and not outside of it (cf. Burr 2015, 202; Jokinen, Juhila & Suoninen 2002, 19). Discursive research 
studies language use, which is everchanging, context and situation-specific during a certain time in 
history (Wetherell 2015, 317). 
 
Thus, our understanding of the world, the categories and concepts we use are dependent on where 
and when in the world we live in (Burr 2015, 4). Therefore, even though the focus is on language 
use, I have built the theory around the concept of belonging because it is an important concept for 
my research. Additionally, because the focus is on language use, I have chosen to present identity, 
categorisation and othering as key concepts to help understand how people construct their 
belonging through language.  
 
3.1 The Discursive Approach to Belonging 
Belonging, how we feel about our position in the world comes into question most strongly when 
there is a sense of exclusion (Anthias 2006, 21). What I have argued earlier is that many EU citizens’ 
belonging to Britain has been under renegotiation due to Brexit. Here I will discuss the importance 
of belonging to individuals, followed by examples of ways people construct their belonging through 
language. 
Belonging is an essential human motivation (Baumeister & Leary 1995, 497) and need (Maslow & 
Frager 1987) which makes life meaningful. A sense of belonging is both a sense of fitting in (Lambert 
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et al. 2013, 1418) and about feeling at home (Yuval-Davis, Kannabirän & Vieten, 2006, 2). To fulfil 
this need, humans comprehensively drive to form long-lasting and favourable interpersonal 
relationships to which they belong to. The number of groups and relationships people form and 
need differ among cultures and societies. Nevertheless, it is understood as natural for all cultures 
and people to form groups. (Baumeister & Leary 1995, 497, 501.) For us to belong to us, there has 
to be a them, we do not belong to and thus, belonging as such requires and contains boundaries 
(Croucher 2004, 47).  
Additionally, belonging is more than just about membership rights and duties as in the case of 
citizenship but also about identification with groups and other people. Furthermore, belonging is 
about specific social places constructed through these identifications and memberships, and the 
various social bonds related to these places. Through social inclusion, we may feel accepted in 
society. Thus, belonging means to feel accepted as part of a community, having a say in the future 
of the community and feeling safe within it. (Anthias 2006, 21 – 22.)  
A discursive approach to belonging allows for different individuals to construct belonging in various 
ways, even at the same place and time (Yuval-Davis et al. 2006, 7). Moreover, language in discursive 
research is not stable but everchanging, allowing for norms, values and identities to change (Gibbins 
2014, 10). Therefore, also belonging is something subject to change among different societies and 
individuals because it is discursively constructed rather than static or stable (cf. Yuval-Davis et al. 
2006, 7; Jones & Krzyzanowski 2011, 43).  In this work particularly, the temporal uniqueness of Brexit 
and the data gathering offer an insight into a specific time into the Brexit process. This work also 
allows for different people, seemingly in the same situation either to talk similarly or differently on 
their belonging and Brexit. People’s views and thoughts change, and so does the media’s, which 
may both affect the overall way Brexit is constructed.  
Thus, arguably analysing people’s language use is a reasonable way to examine people’s belonging.  
3.1.1 Identity in Relation to the Other 
The notion of identity is essential when talking about belonging because identity comes to question 
whenever one is not sure where one belongs (Bauman 2011, 19).  We often take identity for granted, 
although it is one of the most misunderstood in common academic usage (Jones & Krzyzanowski 
2011, 41). Social psychology has, at times, assumed people to have one fixed identity which would 
prompt us to speak in a specific way representing whether we, i.e. possess an authoritarian 
personality or are tolerant individuals, whereas discourse analysts argue that identity is constructed, 
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flexible, multiple and incoherent (Wetherell 1996, 224 – 225). Hence, identity is never static but 
somewhat always changing and evolving in time, under the process of reconstruction (Wodak et al. 
2009, 11; Gibbins 2014, 4).  
Identity is built in relation to the Other, the relationship between two or more people sharing some 
kind of sameness (Wodak et al. 2009, 11; Gibbins 2014, 4). However, often members of certain 
groups see themselves and their group members as more similar than they actually are (Billig 1976, 
325; Wetherell 1996, 212). For us to be who we are, can only exist in relation to someone we are 
not. For example, for someone to be European, there has to be someone who is from a non-
European country who possess a different nationality for the European identity to makes sense. 
Suggesting that we need Others to be able to identify ourselves in relation to the Others. (Gibbins 
2014, 14.) 
Thus, the notion of difference is important because, through difference, we may become who we 
are. Hall (1997, 235) adds that difference as such can be both positive and negative. At the same 
time, though, we may see difference as scary and dangerous, creating anger towards the 
Other. (ibid.) Here what is important is to understand that differentiation is not the same as 
discrimination. Discrimination is only one way of behaviour dependent upon specific cultural 
definitions of certain categories. To think of discrimination as inevitable, may cause dangerous social 
and political implications. Especially a discursive approach helps understand discrimination as not 
unavoidable. Differentiation is a process which is determined not through a function of 
psychological but cultural factors. As well as differentiating an outgroup through negative and 
discriminative behaviour, it could be differentiated by generosity or charitability. The behavioural 
consequences of the process are dependent upon cultural variables. (Reichner & Hopkins 2001, 33 
– 35.)  
In result, identity production can happen in relation to either friends or foes. Hence, identity is both 
about belonging and not belonging. Even though the construction of identity stems from difference, 
it is both through dissimilarities and similarities. Albeit identity cannot exist without being 
positioned against the Other, the Other can be a friend rather than a seemingly enemy. (Gibbins 
2014, 197 – 198.) The Other can be categorised as radical, non-radical and friendly and thus we do 
not have to assume othering always leads to the exclusion of some kind. The radical Other being 
identified as someone who is strongly different from the Self. (Gibbins 2014, 14.)  
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Identity is constructed within discourse in specific historical and institutional forms, within particular 
discursive practises in particular ways (Jones & Krzyzanowski 2011, 43). People construct defensible 
identities or other means to have their ways of events approved and supported by others (Burr 
2015, 65). According to the theory by Jones & Krzyzanowski (2011, 44 – 45), identities are 
constructed both internally by us and externally by the powerful Other. For example, institutional 
gatekeepers can set certain criteria for entry to groups either through membership in a formal sense 
such as citizenship conditions or less formal everyday ways. (ibid.)  
Identities have boundaries; however, they do not necessarily exclude other identities. A person may 
belong to a specific collective identity yet feel belonging to another collective identity. To put it 
simply; we may identify but not feel belonging, and alternatively, we may belong but not fully 
identify. Thus, multiple identities may exist in many ways. (Anthias 2006, 19 – 20; Jones & 
Krzyzanowski 2011, 42.) In other words, multiple identities is a concept when a person belongs to 
more than one collective group resisting the exclusion and differentiation processes (Wodak et al. 
2009, 16 – 17). Multiple identities is a crucial point to bear in mind especially among a study on 
intra-European migration allowing where necessary for people to belong both to their origin and 
host countries, or to identify, i.e. both British and Finnish, or identify as Finnish yet feel at home in 
Britain. 
3.1.2 Categorisation  
Categorisation is particularly important in social psychology and categories are constructed in 
everyday discourse with various functions. Categorisation is a holistic part of people’s discourse, for 
when in conversation people categorise themselves with other social categories such as friends, 
nationality, job titles etc. (Potter & Wetherell 1987, 116.) We categorise everyone, including 
ourselves and see us as group members just like other people see themselves either sharing or not 
sharing our group membership. Thus, other people may see themselves as the same as us or 
different from us. (McGarty 1999, 2.) In result, for us to belong, someone else cannot belong.  
 
Nevertheless, discourse analysts do not see this process of categorisation as a natural phenomenon 
but rather as a complex and delicate social accomplishment that does not automatically happen. 
We use categories in discourse in specific ways to accomplish certain goals, such as blaming or 
justification. (Potter & Wetherell 1978, 116.) Additionally, social categories of our daily life help 
make sense of society and ourselves as well as the Other (Wetherell 1996, 212). Categories are the 
18 
 
basis from which we construct our versions of the social worlds, yet instead of being static they are 
flexible and changing among different people’s discourse in different situations (Potter & Wetherell 
1987, 137). Moreover, these categories must be understood as socially constructed products of 
social activity in a particular historical context (Wetherell 1996, 212). Therefore, we must 
understand and treat categories as linguistic structures (Billig 1976, 332). 
 
 We all have many self-categories, but certain situations define which categories are more or less 
important to us. Through our self-categories, we receive the values, norms and understandings, to 
guide what we shall and shall not do. Depending on the situation, we may behave differently. For 
instance, in a conversation between a feminist and a radical feminist both may disagree, but once 
an anti-feminist joins the conversation, the discrepancy of the former decreases. (Reicher & Hopkins 
2001, 38.)  
 
Categorisation consists of simplification. Because people are motivated to value the self positively, 
differentiation between one’s own and other categories is often radical and partial in favour of the 
ingroup. (Hogg & Abrams 2006, 183.) Discourses, like any other discriminatory action, can be used 
to problematise, marginalise and exclude outgroups, especially minorities. Sometimes all foreigners 
are alleged as members of one single homogenous group, simplified as migrants or foreigners, albeit 
coming from different countries with a variety of different backgrounds and motives. (Wodak 2011, 
55 – 57.) As stated in section 2.3, right-wing populist rhetoric in the Brexit campaigning process used 
exclusive language against foreigners and constructed them all into a homogenous group. A 
discursive position perceives power precisely being operated among patters of inclusion and 
exclusion instead of being a possession of material resources or capacity (Gibbins 2014, 10). There 
is surely nothing in common all foreigners in Britain share that the Britons do not or vice versa 
something all Britons have in common that other nationalities do not.  
 
To clarify, if we assume the world is divided into two categories A and B, all the A’s would possess 
something in common to distinguish them from all the Bs. If this was the case and social group 
categories would reflect the differences between groups, we could argue that stereotypes are true 
and all members of, i.e. a certain nation possess a distinguishing characteristic from all other 
nationalities. (Billig 1976, 326.) For instance, the stereotype of Finns being silent and going to sauna 
would be valid for all Finns, a distinguishing characteristic from all other nationalities. I happen to 
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know for a fact that not all Finns are silent or go to the sauna. Thus, instead of assuming similarities 
between group members would determine the existence of social groups, we could assume it is the 
differences between group members that determine the existence of these groups. In result, the 
mere feeling of similarity within a group membership rather than any traits or significant social facts 
underlying that label plays a central role in categorisation. (Billig 1976, 332 – 334.) In result, there 
need not be anything the Finnish participants of this thesis share in common with each other which 
would distinguish them from the British or other nationalities. Finnishness is only a social category 
just like any other nationality.   
 
Condor’s study helps us to challenge a view that social categories would be defined in common traits 
or moreover within any commonalities between category members. Highlighting that social 
categories may just as well refer to ways people exist within a common institution or territory. 
Rather than having to do with how we live together as well as who we are. (Reicher & Hopkins 2001, 
45.) In her study, Condor (2000) asked English people about their country, and surprisingly the 
respondents were unusually sensitive and cautious when talking about their country. The careful 
way the participants spoke indicated a general awareness of the possibility that they might be held 
responsible for their nationalist thoughts. (Condor 2000, 194 – 195.)  
Furthermore, instead of assuming belonging to be based on external sameness, it must be based to 
some extent on elective attachments. In other words, belonging requires an individual situating 
themselves in relation to a collective. Inevitably people with similar attachments in similar situations 
and backgrounds may develop different senses of belonging. (Jones & Krzyzanowski 2011, 46, 50.) 
3.1.3 Othering and Discursive Discrimination  
Discrimination, as stated by Boreus (2013), is “unfavourable treatment of people due to their 
alleged belonging to a particular group”. Discursive discrimination is the same unfavourable 
treatment, just through the use of language. (Boreus 2013, 294 – 295.) The discursive construction 
of cultural or racial otherness may exclude migrants and minorities from main social groups and 
accomplish domination over them. The discourse of exclusion is constructed most of all by people 
in official or semi-official positions of power and, i.e. institutionalise it on immigration policies. Thus, 
everyday racism and right-wing political extremism continue to exist. (Wimmer 2002, 208 – 209.) As 
there were two primary campaigns in Britain in 2016 either campaigning in favour of staying or 
leaving the EU, both voices were strongly heard. Above all, it was the discourse used by political 
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parties, politicians and people in power who decided what the news and media discourse were. The 
victory of the Leave campaign in a way may for some be understood as a legitimisation to exclude 
EU migrants. 
 
Boreus (2006, 419) claims that very likely there is always some form of othering among 
discrimination. The preconditions for discursive discrimination are that categories are used to group 
people together and that they and we are placed into different categories. People distinguish each 
other between different categories, between themselves as belonging and distinguishing between 
Others who they see as not belonging, resulting in othering between the groups. The more diverse 
the Others are thought to be, the more differently they can be treated. Nevertheless, the treatment 
has not to be negative, drawing on an example of superheroes. We often see superheroes as 
considerably different to us, however mostly in a positive light, something superior to us. (ibid.) 
Racism is one form of discriminative practise (Burr 2015, 65 – 67). It is a different treatment of 
marginalising, excluding and discrimination against those who are perceived to be different based 
on their ethnic group membership (Wetherell 1996, 178).  
 
In the process of othering, the categorisation is established by the dominant group which constructs 
group boundaries and situates other groups to lesser categories. Even though categories are made 
up, the different treatment of outgroups, as well as their experiences of being dominated, are real 
(Strani & Sczepaniak-Kozak 2018, 164 – 166). Rodin (2017) examined experiences of an integration 
project between residents and immigrants aiming to ease the formation of friendship-like 
relationships between each other. The study found that both the natives and foreign-born used us-
them language. Emphasising that othering and belonging must be understood as deliberate 
constructive practises, not fixed processes. (Rodin 2017, 604, 609, 614.)  
 
Huot et al. (2016, 132) recognise a trend in the discourse of desirable migrants who were seen as 
having skills and being able to contribute to society. On the contrary, undesirable migrants such as 
refugees and asylum seekers were seen as lacking these skills according to their economic potential. 
The former seen as deserving and the latter as undeserving. (ibid.) According to these findings, there 
should be no division of a worthy and undeserving migrant among intra-European migration; 
instead, all EU migrants should be treated as skilled migrants.  
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Johnson et al. (2004, 264) studied South Asian immigrant women in the context of health care 
services and their coping strategies towards being othered. The respondents sometimes distanced 
themselves from other South Asian women to be able to fit in the host country rather 
than othered. (ibid.) Arguably these women were othering against their alleged (nationality) group, 
to be able to fit in and belong to where they were (nation). Drawing on Jensen (2011, 73), a strategy 
for humanisation is to claim normality by stating one is not that different. Highlighting 
that othering is not a straightforward process, and individuals do not always accept becoming the 
Other. (ibid.) The study by Neiterman, Salmonsson, & Bourgeault (2015, 791) found that 
respondents who had a different nationality than the host country had experienced racism and 
discrimination, distinguishing their otherness from the group. However, they were also actively 
constructing their own sense of otherness. In conclusion, the experiences of being othered are 
everchanging and dynamic. (Neiterman et al. 2015, 790 – 791.) 
 
In their study, Kim, Suyemoto & Turner (2010) found that people adopted from Korea who had lived 
in America all their lives questioned their sense of belonging due to visible appearance. The Korean 
participants, with their seemingly different looks, found themselves explaining to people where they 
were from all the time. (Kim et al. 2010, 184.) As stated in this section, it seems as though Brexit 
challenges the ‘typical’ othering process for anyone and everyone foreign or seemingly different 
could be constructed as the Other. Migrants and minorities have been othered in Britain already 
before the Referendum. However, after the Referendum, othering has been extended even to 
groups considered advantaged, being educated, white and middle class. (Zontini & Pero 2019, 2.) 
 
Thus, I argue that even though we could construct Brexit in multiple ways, i.e., as a phenomenon 
under which anyone may face exclusion, the different ways people have experienced it is real. Brexit 
seems to support research in which othering is not only referred to those who are seemingly 
disparate. Suggesting that we other ourselves from the Others in terms of belonging more, i.e. to 
the mainstream by claiming we are not like the Others (non-mainstream). We may 
also other ourselves from the mainstream by not wanting to be part of it. Or then we may feel 
marginalised because we were othered.  To conclude, for us to be us, we need a comparison 
towards someone we are not who we assume is different. To differentiate against someone does 
not have to be negative nor seen as natural. These categories which make up our sense of them and 
us are not seen as natural phenomena, but rather as human constructions bound to ideologies and 
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mobilised in rhetoric and argument (Wetherell 1996, 227). Because categories are not natural, 
neither is racism, discrimination or exclusion according to any similarity or difference. Brexit seems 
to underline this by demonstrating that anyone can be constructed as the Other who does not 
belong.  
 
Next, I will present the research question around which I have built this whole work. 
4. Research Question 
In January 2019 the British Parliament voted on former Prime Minister Theresa May’s deal on the 
future relations of Britain and the European Union for the first time. At the time of the vote, I was 
in Finland and had just closed my Brexit-questionnaire which had been open in a closed Facebook 
group for a week. Within this week, I had received 194 responses to my Brexit-questionnaire, of 
which 192 had permitted their answers to be used as data for this master’s thesis. Even though the 
vote itself was not a topic the Finnish respondents talked about, the timing was unique in the sense 
that Brexit was spoken a lot in the news both in Finland and in Britain. From the number of 
responses, it is evitable that Finnish people have been affected by Brexit, but their voice has been 
missing. Often the Finnish participants demonstrated a loss of belonging or a sense of 
unwelcomeness due to Brexit. For this reason, I chose to analyse different belonging discourses.  
 
Choosing to analyse the data with discourse analysis, language is above all seen as functional rather 
than only descriptive (Burr 2015, 68). Through people’s language, we cannot find out people’s 
experiences, emotions or memories. Although not denying they don’t exist, just that we have no 
access to them through texts. (Burr 2015, 152.) Therefore, I cannot access these Finnish 
respondents’ experiences, only their texts and accounts which they have constructed with the 
cultural resources available. Thus the aim is to examine what these Finns are doing with their 
writings. Also, what are the functions of their accounts and what they aim to achieve (Burr 2015, 
150). 
 
Discourse analysis is based on social constructionism which takes a rather different approach to 
epistemological positions than hard sciences such as physics and biology. Such sciences take 
positions of positivism and empiricism which assume that through observation the world reveals to 
us the way it is. Social constructionism does not assume the world is the way we observe it to be 
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but rather that there are alternative ways the world could be constructed. (Burr 2015, 2 – 3.) What 
we regard as real are not products of objective observations but outcomes of social interactions 
(Burr 2015, 5). A thesis based on social constructionism aims not to find the ultimate truth for it 
denies there is one. Instead, I aim to find out different versions of different people’s Brexit realities. 
 
When people speak, they also always construct their identity (Wetherell 1996, 225). Identities are 
constructed through the discourses culturally available to us upon our communication with others 
(cf. Hall 2011; Burr 2015, 123). Therefore, besides finding out what kind of belonging and non-
belonging discourses the Finnish participants constructed, another specific interest was on their 
identity construction.  
Thus the research questions this thesis aims to answer are as follows: 
What kind of belonging and non-belonging discourses do Finns construct in Brexit Britain? 
What is the function of the (non)-belonging discourses? 
What kind of identities do these discourses construct?  
5.Study Design  
I will present the study design of this work in this Chapter. Firstly, I will explain the data collection 
process, and secondly, I will describe the gathered data. I will conclude the Chapter with some 
ethical considerations regarding data collection.  
5.1 Data Collection – Brexit Questionnaire 
The design of this thesis is a qualitative type to which I gathered empirical data through an online 
questionnaire (appendix 1) on Brexit, targeted for Finns living or recently had lived in Britain. I 
collected the data via a closed Facebook group supposedly made for Finnish people living in Britain. 
At the time of the data collection (15.1.2019) the group consisted of roughly 4700 (4752) members. 
I had been a member of the group since autumn 2017 when I was doing a student exchange in 
Britain. I had recognised there to be a low threshold in asking question among the group and for 
this reason, I also hoped to receive responses to my questionnaire. I put the questionnaire up in the 
evening of the 8th of January in 2019, just a week before the British Parliament would vote on Prime 
Minister May’s suggested deal. The deal would try to determine the future relationship between 
Britain and the EU. Afterwards, we know that the Parliament voted against the deal with historically 
high numbers 432-202 the next week, followed by two preventions later. 
24 
 
Nevertheless, the outcome was not known during data collection. Thus I decided to leave the 
questionnaire open for only a week so that the result of the vote would not affect my data. Like said 
earlier, the timing of data collection was unique in terms that Brexit was talked about a lot in the 
news, not just in Britain but in Finland also. I closed the questionnaire a week after I had put it, on 
the evening of the 15th of January 2019, just less than an hour before the British Parliament’s vote.  
Due to Brexit being such a current topic without any research explicitly done from a Finn’s 
perspective, I believed any new information would be valuable. Thus, without previous examples, 
the questionnaire aims to instead ask too much than too little. The online Brexit-questionnaire 
consisted of twelve questions of which half were open-ended questions to which the upcoming 
analysis is also based on. The questionnaire was structured to start with multiple-choice background 
questions for warm-up, which is recommended to ease the answering process (Valli & Aarnos 2018, 
94). The aim of the background questions was also to describe the data as presented in the next 
section. The Finnish participants had not, in many cases, answered all the voluntary background 
questions and thus the data description as followed in the next section is not necessarily a whole 
representative of the data.  
Albeit questionnaire questions should not be leading (Valli & Aarnos 2018, 93), the reader of this 
thesis, might recognise that one of the questions (q10) is a rather leading one, asking about the 
uncertainties Brexit has possibly caused. The reason for this is that I began with the aim to find out 
how Finnish people had coped with the uncertainties of Brexit. However, I found other themes more 
relevant, and thus, the outcome of the analysis was a data-oriented.  
The questionnaire was put up with a cover text (appendix 2) both in Finnish and English stating that 
all participants and received data would be treated anonymously. Additionally, I invited to answer 
the questionnaire either in English or Finnish. In the cover text, I also encouraged anyone to answer 
the questionnaire who felt like they fit my description of being a Finn living (or recently had lived) 
in Britain. The link to the questionnaire could be shared further. However, because the group in 
question was a closed group, only copying the link onwards could anyone from outside the group 
fill in the questionnaire. 
5.2 Data Description 
Within a week the online Brexit-questionnaire received 194 responses of which two did not give 
permission for their answers to be used as data neither for this master’s thesis nor further research; 
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thus I removed and destroyed their answers immediately. Of the 192 respondents, 85% were 
female, 14% were male, and one person had answered other than male or female as their gender. 
One respondent had not answered the gender question at all.  
 
Over 70% of the respondents had a higher degree of education. 57% of the whole data were 30-49-
year-olds. When asked about nationality, 85% stated themselves as being only Finnish. Thirteen of 
the participants responded being both Finnish and some other nationality, of which ten said they 
were both Finnish and British. Fourteen people did not answer anything when asked about 
nationality. 
 
As mentioned earlier, I invited the participants to answer either in English or Finnish, even though 
the questionnaire itself was in English. Of the respondents 18 replied in Finnish, some used both 
English and Finnish in their answers, but most responded fully in English. Over 60% of the data 
participants had lived in Britain for more than five years, and five respondents had moved away by 
the time I gathered the data. I haven’t changed the data besides clear spelling errors. Whenever I 
have translated from Finnish to English, I have mentioned it at the end of the quote, as NP. 
Translations necessarily change the meaning of the text. Still, I chose to use translations rather than 
exclude the answers in Finnish completely. The original versions of the quotes can be found in the 
END NOTES.  
 
5.3 Ethical Considerations  
Anonymity in research is essential because of the promise the researcher gives to the participants 
for their responses to be treated as anonymously and confidentially. It is also vital to allow the 
participants to speak their mind without others knowing. It is crucial to keep participants safe from 
possible harm that the research may cause. Thus, a promising start in keeping the researcher’s 
promise is to already in data collection use online surveys or questionnaires so that the data is never 
identifiable. Although gathering identifiable information is not an issue if all recognisable parts are 
removed from the results. (Farrimond 2013, 128 – 130.) Even though I had thought I had gathered 
all data anonymously, some ethical considerations did follow, which I will briefly present here. 
 
During the time of data gathering, I knew there were differences in areas in Britain on how they 
either voted against or in favour of Brexit. Thus, I was also interested in whether Finns living in 
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different areas in Britain would have differences in their responses. For this reason, one of the 
background questions asked for participant’s postal code which can be called identifying data. 
Identifying data is something from which the participant can be identified. (Farrimond 2013, 128, 
133.) In the end, I chose not to use participants’ residency to describe the data, as it was such 
detailed. The reason I asked for postal code in the first place was that in Finland it is mostly 
presented as a five-digit number. In contrast, in Britain or at least in my data, the respondents would 
sometimes give their whole house name in the background question which asked about postal code. 
I found house name too identified and thus for the promise of anonymity chose not to use this 
particular background question at all.  
 
I had put the questionnaire into a closed Facebook group asking anyone to answer who may have 
something to say about Brexit. Thus answering my questionnaire was completely voluntary. 
Nevertheless, to promote ethical considerations in addition to the twelve questions, there were two 
compulsory questions which asked for respondents’ approval for their answers to be used as data 
for this master’s thesis, following with a question asking whether the answers could be used in 
possible further research. Without ticking the boxes for no or yes, the participants could not submit 
their answers. After I have finished and handed in this thesis, I will delete all data from participants 
who did not permit their answers to be used in possible further research. I will also delete all data 
regarding postal codes. 
I have strictly kept the data in my own use, saved it to Excel on my laptop that is secured behind a 
password. I will discuss more ethics regarding the researcher’s position in Chapter nine. However, 
next, I will present the chosen method of analysis in more detail.  
6.Research Method 
I have chosen to use discourse analysis for the research method of this thesis. To understand 
discourse analysis, we much first understand social constructionism. Thus in the next sections, I will 
provide information firstly on social constructionism and afterwards on discourse analysis, followed 
by the analysis process itself. 
6.1 Social Constructionism  
Social constructionism is a theoretical orientation which challenges traditional psychological and 
social psychological theories, offering critical and even radical alternatives for both psychology and 
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social psychology. Mainstream psychology has been criticised precisely for its imperialist way of 
seeing other cultures having colonised them specifically through Western ideas and ways. Social 
constructionism treats language as not only describing our world but as an essential part in 
constructing our reality. (Burr 2015, 1, 4, 65.) There are many different varieties of social 
constructionism. For clarity I aim to mostly refer to social constructionist Vivien Burr who is a 
metaphysical realist, meaning that she does not deny the existence of an external world outside of 
language (Pernecky 2016, 15, 143).  
Social constructionism encourages us to reassess our taken-for-granted ways of understanding the 
world and ourselves. It invites us to challenge the categories we have divided the world into. 
Suggesting that these categories could have been constructed in various other ways. What we 
observe to be could be observed differently. Categories, concepts and ways of understanding are 
culturally and historically specific; at the same time, they are being produced through a particular 
culture and time in history. Similarly, instead of having categorised people according to gender, we 
could have categorised each other, i.e. according to height or eye colour. (Burr 2015, 1 – 5.) 
Therefore, we must not take categories as such. Instead of background questions asking about age, 
they could be asking about hair colour. The world could always be constructed differently with 
alternative use of language, and people approach the world all differently through their social 
relationships. Through these social relationships, we construct the world through communication in 
a way that it occurs to us. Even though it is the same world we humans live in, it means different 
things to us, and thus we experience it differently. (Gergen 2009, 3 – 5; Burr 2015, 4 – 5.) 
Weak and strong forms of social constructionism accept that even though social realities are 
constructed, natural objects or scientific facts are not. Only the very strong or radical form of social 
constructionism denies a mind-independent existence or a world outside of language and text. (cf. 
Burr 2015, 94; Pernecky 2016, 142.) To clarify, even though social constructionists claim that people 
construct social realities, most do accept that language is not the only reality (cf. Edley 2001, 439; 
Pernecky 2016, 15). A non-extreme form of social constructionism does believe there exists a reality 
even outside discourse providing the material from which we construct our understanding of the 
world through discourse (Burr 2015, 114) and as soon as we begin to explain what there is, we enter 
the world of discourse. In other words, the understanding of rocks and trees as what they are, is 
socially constructed. (Pernecky 2016, 143.)  
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This thesis also aims to emphasise that even though there are multiple ways to construct Brexit 
realities through discourse, the experiences people have felt due to it are real. Not saying that 
someone else’s experience is more real than someone else’s; instead, that experiences whether 
negative or positive in general are real. Even though examining experience is not an aim of discourse 
analysis, the way people talk about their experiences is. However, it is not limited to this, but 
participants discourses, in general, are the interest of examination (Potter & Wetherell 1987, 160). 
The debate between reality and truth among social constructionists vary and is sometimes named 
as the relativism - realism debate (Burr 2015, 95). The realist discourse analysist represents the 
ontological sense, whereas the relativist discourse analysist represents the epistemic sense of social 
constructionism (Juhila 1999, 162 – 164). The ontological sense of social constructionism assumes 
that there is a world outside of discourses, whereas the epistemic takes no position on the matter. 
According to an epistemological pronouncement, we cannot say that there is no world outside of 
discourse or that there is a world outside of discourse because we cannot know that, for we cannot 
go beyond the discourse. (cf. Juhila 1999, 162 – 164; Edley 2001, 436 – 437.) In result, the epistemic 
sense of social constructionism suggests that there is no need to divide the world and words, or 
between the material and the symbolic. Thus, instead of saying whether something exists or doesn’t 
exist, social constructionists simply say that this something is socially constructed. (Edley 2001, 437 
– 439.)  
These constructions in their different ways include patterns of social action and the exclusion of 
others. Thus, our constructions of the world are also tied to power relations. These power relations 
affect what is permitted for different people to do and how others may legitimately treat others. 
(Burr 2015, 4 – 5.) For example, alcoholics were in the earlier days seen as responsible for their 
drinking, villains instead of victims, compared to nowadays when alcoholism (in the West at least) 
is seen as an addiction. Instead of punishment, alcoholics are believed to need treatment. (ibid.) 
Thus, even though the idea of constructing a world free of conflict or hate sounds wonderful, it is 
not entirely up to us but also dependent on the power relations. 
Social constructionism denies the ways in which the world is understood as coming from an 
objective reality, suggesting that instead, the ways of understanding come from other people from 
the past and present. People are born to a world where specific conceptual frameworks and 
categories used by people in their culture already exist.  (Burr 2015, 9 – 10.) People may perhaps 
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talk about what they have heard friends or relatives talk about or what has been in the broader 
political or discursive sphere (Gibbs 2018, 95). 
People may take subject positions, meaning that they take a role in their discourse as a way of 
validating their saying. When people are not consistent even during one conversation, it does not 
mean that they are being contradictory but that they are simply adjusting their discourse to fit the 
specific situation. (Gibbs 2018, 95.) For instance, when I discuss Brexit on the train in England with 
someone I have never met, I will be more careful and cautious about what word choices to make. 
Not because I am embarrassed about my opinion regarding the topic but because I don’t want to 
offend a stranger whose particular stand I am not aware of. On the contrary, when I discuss Brexit 
with a friend, I will be more open and freer in my discourse use, not only because I know where we 
both stand but also because I know that even if I said something she disagreed with, we would still 
be able to remain as friends.  
Language changes and is situational and thus, for new ways of using words, a new shared meaning 
must be accomplished. However, depending on the situation, words have different meanings in 
different situations (Burr 2015, 55.) For me to ever begin to write about Brexit, some kind of shared 
meaning and definition of Brexit had to exist. Then again, Brexit is still a rather new phenomenon, 
affecting others so much more than others, thus having multiple different meanings for various 
individuals. Two years ago, I would have had little to say on the topic, whereas a year ago a lot more. 
Yet, not nearly as much as today. 
Moreover, Brexit is an ongoing process which has no clear definition, and due to its changing nature, 
people’s discourses on it are doomed to change also. Furthermore, looking three years back, Brexit 
was perhaps talked about somewhat differently than during now, then during my data gathering in 
January 2019. Then again three years ago, someone might have spoken about Brexit similarly than 
today. Nevertheless, I am claiming that thirteen years ago, the discussions on Brexit were very (if 
not completely) non-existent because Brexit didn’t exist. Nevertheless, the UKIP party was already 
campaigning in favour of Britain leaving the EU, so perhaps Brexit did exist already then. Even 
though Brexit in a sense doesn’t exist even today as there is no clear definition that would be 
comprehensive, it exists in people’s discussions, in the media all-around Europe and specifically in 
this thesis and among my gathered data. Thus, in the world of discourse, Brexit is as real as any 
other phenomenon.  
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As already discussed in this section, the role of language is essential in social constructionism. 
Furthermore, discourse analysis is the method which analyses the use of language and what people 
aim to achieve by their language or in this case how Finns construct Brexit belongings. Thus, next, I 
will discuss discourse analysis in more detail.         
6.2 Discourse Analysis  
 Discourse analysis is both a method and a broad theoretical framework which has no universally 
agreed definition. Nevertheless, research most often suggests that discourse is used to mean talk, 
writing or singing with which people together bring the world into being. (Johnstone 2008, 29, 33.) 
Discourse analysis offers insight into how discourse can best be studied (Potter & Wetherell 1987, 
175). Discourse analysists treat texts as “complex, cultural and psychological products, constructed 
in particular ways to make things happen”. The use of language among social interactions creates 
various social worlds and all texts can be used as part of research. (Potter & Wetherell 1987, 3, 7.) 
As noted above, this thesis focuses on online writings.  
 
According to Burr (2015, 24) the two major forms of social constructionist theory and research are 
macro and micro social constructionism. Micro social constructionism is typically referred to as 
discursive psychology. In contrast, macro social constructionism is often referred to as Foucauldian 
analysis. Both forms may be referred to as discourse analysis, and they can be used together not 
needing to exclude each other. (Burr 2015, 24 – 26, 179.) Micro social constructionism views us 
people as users and manipulators of language and discourse for our purposes and is interested in 
the situated use of language among people and “how people actively construct accounts in 
interaction”. (Burr 2015, 145 – 146.) Macro social constructionism states that people are subject to 
discourses which they cannot resist. An extreme form of macro social constructionism would see 
humans as secondary and as products of the discourse of their lives. (Burr 2015, 144, 154.) This 
thesis should be understood as a micro version of social constructionism because I see it is the 
Finnish participants using discourse instead of discourse using them. Even though, the use of 
discourse is always limited to a particular culture, situation and time in history.   
 
The pioneers of discursive psychology Potter & Wetherell (1987, 9) argue that the study of language 
is specifically essential to social psychology, for it is simply the most primal and pervasive form of 
interaction between people. They claim that language is often taken for granted, however crucial 
for our everyday communication, thinking and reasoning. To put it simply: we could not think 
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without language as our thoughts are created through language and various social constructions. 
However, in everyday life, there is rarely a need to question language before misunderstandings 
occur or different cultures with different languages meet. (ibid.)  
 
Any sorts of questions about humans in society may be answered with the use of discourse analysis. 
Thus, the use of discourse analysis offers endless opportunities to understand human beings more. 
(Johnstone 2008, 7.) Potter & Wetherell (1987,7) on the one hand emphasise the importance of 
language, and on the other hand, their focus is not merely on linguistics or discourse itself but more 
so in gaining a better understanding of the social world through social interactions and texts. 
Discourse analysis is broader than just language analysis as it aims to examine how people use 
language to make certain things happen. How people express emotions, exchange information, in 
general, do things in the world, and not only language as an abstract system. (cf. Potter & Wetherell 
1987, 6; Johnstone 2008, 3.) Similarly, even though I examine the ways Finns talk about their 
belonging and non-belonging in Brexit Britain, I also aim to understand the world of Brexit where 
these Finns and other EU nationals have found themselves.  
 
Potter & Wetherell (1987, 32) present three major components of discourse analysis which are: 
function, construction and variation. Function refers to people doing things with the use of language 
such as requesting, ordering, persuading or accusing. However, people are rarely explicit in 
this doing process and instead move crosswise and are less direct in what they aim to accomplish 
with their saying. There are no certain rules to be followed to know whether someone is persuading 
or requesting; rather the interpretations are dependent on the analyst reading the context. (Potter 
& Wetherell 1987, 32 – 33.) An example could be a person in a late-night party saying that they are 
tired. They might be trying to indicate to their friend that they want to go home instead of directly 
saying they want to go home. However, someone else might interpret the same text as a request 
for coffee, for example. 
 
Construction is a process that involves active selection in which some resources are used, and some 
are not. This active selection as such is most often not adequate. Instead, people simply use their 
language naturally the way it occurs to them instead of actively thinking about what to say or not 
to say and how. (Potter & Wetherell 1987, 34.) We are not always aware or conscious in our 
practices as some practices become automatic or are deeply embedded in history and culture. 
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Nevertheless, discursive researchers assume that people’s discourse is more likely patterned and 
ordered than chaotic. (Wetherell 2015, 317.)  
 
Variation in discourse analysis suggests that language is used for many different functions and the 
same phenomenon could be described in various ways. These multiple ways offer alternative truths. 
(Potter & Wetherell 1987, 35; Burr 2015, 76.) The focus in discourse analysis is on the discourse 
itself and how it has been organised and what it is doing (Potter & Wetherell 1987, 49). For instance, 
when people describe trees, especially if coming from different cultures, they will have different 
descriptions. When I think of a tree, I most often think of birch or spruce which are common species 
of trees in Finland. As someone who has lived in Finland most of her life, it is not a surprising finding. 
Thus, for me, a tree is either a green Christmas tree-like or zebra-coloured one. Nevertheless, 
someone in a similar position as I might be thinking about palm trees due to just been on holiday 
somewhere surrounded by palm trees. Additionally, not everyone will think about a specific tree 
species, simply because not everywhere in the world are there trees, for example. Thus, our 
explanations of trees will potentially vary.  
 
Moreover, because all texts can be used as objects of research (Potter & Wetherell 1987, 3), even 
this thesis cannot become immune from this kind of analysing. I as a researcher must be aware of 
all the various ways this thesis could have been written and through that constructed a different 
view to Brexit. Drawing on Adler-Nissen, Galpin & Rosamond (2017, 575) “speaking about Brexit 
does not simply describe a given reality, it also constructs it”. I acknowledge that researchers come 
from different places with different life views and already make a fundamental decision when 
choosing which topics are worth investigating more thoroughly. Different readers will also construct 
different opinions about this text and through that their Brexit reality may change to one way or 
another or not change at all.  
 
6.2.1 Doing Discourse Analysis 
 Albeit, discourse analysis is above all a theoretical framework instead of a method as such (Potter 
& Wetherell 1987, 175), it provides some guidance for doing discourse analysis. To begin with, 
choosing the research question is essential, which both starts as well as guides the analysing 
process. Although it can and often does change during the writing process. (ibid.) My research 
question for this thesis also changed from only a non-belonging side to also a belonging side to 
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Brexit, as soon as I accepted the discourse variation. I chose a more analytical than a critical way of 
analysing: analytical and critical discourse analysis are the opposite to each other. Critical discourse 
analysis starts off with the assumption that someone is being oppressed and thus examines how the 
oppression is taking place and under what circumstances. Analytical discourse analysis is more 
open-minded to the data, not assuming it consists of any kind of injustice. Nevertheless, the findings 
may include injustice, and thus the two approaches mustn’t need to exclude each other. (Jokinen et 
al. 2002, 86 – 87.)  
 
Coding is also essential in discourse analysis as well as in all qualitative research, and it prepares to 
the actual analysis process, enabling the researcher to go deeper. Only after coding may the 
phenomenon of interest become visible. Often, moving between analysis and coding. Discourse 
analysis, as well as any qualitative analysis, includes a lot of re-reading the data over and over again. 
A discourse analyst does not seek for a general idea from the text but rather how something has 
been said or written, however fragmented or contradictory. Exceptions are as important as 
commonalities. (Potter & Wetherell 1987, 168 – 169.)  
 
Researchers both describe and construct social reality through their research which may have 
different consequences and thus s/he must be sensitive within the analysing and interpretation 
processes (Jokinen et al. 2016, 50). Thus, when I analysed my data, it was necessary to bear in mind 
that the data was gathered in January 2019 and the answers were given to a Brexit-questionnaire 
made by me, a Finnish university student — emphasising the context, specific situation and time in 
history. 
 
Research also begins from a specific view. Arguably even two people who similarly use their 
language may experience the world differently. The other one did not necessarily use their language 
in a more consistent way than the other one, but simply because our cultural vocabulary is very 
limited. Taking a discursive approach to Brexit, I argue, enables Brexit to be as real as anything 
constructed in language. It is important to notify how much meaning Brexit has to different 
individuals, even though as such has not happened yet. In the next section, I explain in detail how I 
proceeded with the analysing process.  
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6.2.2 Analysis 
 After closing the questionnaire, I transferred the data into Excel and deleted the two responses 
from the participants who had not permitted their answers to be used as data for research. After 
which, I printed the data out and went through it over and over again. 
 
As mentioned earlier, a loss of belonging due to Brexit was a theme many accounts discussed. Thus, 
I began searching for statements which somehow demonstrated a loss of belonging or a sense of 
not being welcome to Britain anymore. Quite quickly, I named these discourses because it eased my 
own way of categorising answers under these discourses. Nevertheless, accounts that instead of a 
loss of belonging discussed about applying for citizenship or seemingly spoke about a belonging side 
did not fit my categories of non-belonging. Thus, I began also searching for accounts that somehow 
reasoned why they did not feel unwelcome. 
 
I also mentioned earlier that I chose to use an analytical discourse analysis rather than a critical one. 
However, my starting point had been rather critical, for I had positioned myself as a researcher who 
would find the injustice these Finnish respondents reported they had experienced due to Brexit, as 
well to discuss what other EU nationals had said. Partly this is perhaps what I have done. However, 
after going more into discourse analysis, an open coding process began to take place which I refer 
to as data-driven coding. The aim of data-driven coding is that it is done with an open mind. 
Recognising, however, that no one can have an absolutely open mind because we all start off with 
a specific idea. The researcher is both an observer of the social world and a part of that same world. 
We all have ideas of what we might expect to be happening, and as social scientists, we are likely to 
have more than many others as a result of our awareness of empirical research and theoretical 
ideas. (Gibbs 2018, 61.)  
 
Finding another side to the construction of non-belonging to Britain, which is the belonging side, 
was only possible after re-reading the data and method over and over again. The re-reading helped 
me create a more open mind. Only after a long process of analysing fort and back did I realise the 
study participants were constructing a belonging and a loss of belonging with the use of their 
language. In the discussion Chapter (ch.9), I discuss my position as a researcher who has lived in 
Britain as a non-British Finnish national myself. I claim it has also helped me to come to the empirical 
findings as presented in the next Chapter.  
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This thesis has focused heavily on of EU nationals and Brexit, following next with a specific focus on 
how Finnish people talk about Brexit. For many of the study participants belonging was shaken but 
not for all. It is important to emphasise that none of the questionnaire questions (appendix 1) asked 
about belonging, yet this was a theme that arose many times. Thus, the research question aims to 
answer what kind of belonging and non-belonging discourses Finns construct in Brexit 
Britain, including the construction of both non-belonging and belonging 
7.Empirical Findings 
The objective of this thesis was to analyse Finnish participants different (non-)belonging discourses 
in Brexit Britain. The focus was in the function of these discourses and also the various identities 
they constituted. From the data, with the use of discourse analysis as presented in the previous 
Chapter, I found four different discourses that I have named as non-belongingness, active exclusion, 
othering and deservingness. These discourses were used to construct either a loss of belonging or a 
sense of belonging to Britain in January 2019. 
Figure 1. Finnish participants’ (non-)belonging discourses in Brexit Britain.  
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Horizontal axel = Function of the discourse; either a construction of belonging or a loss of 
belonging  
Vertical axel = Identity construction 
 
The figure (figure 1) presented above aims to distinguish these discourses form each other. The 
horizontal axel demonstrates whether I have placed the discourse as more of a construction of 
belonging or loss of belonging. In contrast, the vertical axel illuminates whether the discourse is 
more of a constitution of an active identity or a passive one, meaning that Others have decided for 
the participant. On the left side of the figure, I have placed active exclusion and non-
belongingness as discourses that potentially construct the closest to a total loss of belonging. The 
difference between them is that non-belongingness constructs an identity of resistance, 
whereas active exclusion constructs more of a hopeless identity. On the right side of the figure, I 
have placed othering and deservingness as discourses that construct a sense of belonging. The 
discourse on othering constructs resilient and caring identities, whereas deservingness constructs 
more of an identity of acceptance, enabling Others to perform the categorisation process.  
 
The discourses will sometimes overlap and can be seen as both complementing each other or as 
appearing independently. Some respondents may have used all of these different discourses while 
answering the Brexit-questionnaire. Hence, the purpose is not to distinguish people into discourses 
but people’s language into discourses. 
 
7.1 Non-Belongingness  
The discourse on non-belongingness constructs a loss of belonging to Britain through accounts such 
as Britain no longer feeling welcoming or statements saying that participants have left Britain or are 
planning on moving out and through that construct resisting identities. Leaving Britain can be seen 
as taking resistance as in being someone who refuses to live in a country that no longer feels 
welcome. Thus, the function of the non-belongingness discourse is to both construct a loss of 
belonging to Britain but also to resist the loss of belonging and take one’s own life into one’s own 
hands by being in a position to leave and perhaps through that search for belongingness from 
somewhere else.  
”Brexit has been the only factor ever that has made me consider moving back to Finland, 
or at least move into another EU country”  
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“I am thinking about returning to Finland just to make my life easier. Not having to worry 
everyday” 
“I used to love London and recognised it as home, now I no longer feel like I belong here. 
If I moved out, I would miss certain things from here a lot, however I could live without 
them if alternatively I would feel at home and not alien. Even though no one has told me 
to leave, I no longer feel as rooted here” (translated by NP5) 
These three accounts construct a loss of belonging to Britain due to considering or planning on 
leaving the country. The accounts are stating that belonging has not necessarily been lost 
completely but it has been challenged enough to make them think about returning to Finland or at 
least into another EU country. The first account highlights the power Brexit has in influencing 
people's belonging, for Brexit has been the only factor that has made one consider moving away. 
The second account is perhaps a more practical reason, planning on returning to Finland because of 
the everyday worry Brexit is causing. One fundamental reason Brexit is such a cause of worry for 
many is its unclear definition and the ongoing lengthiness of it. 
 The third account is constructing reasoning why one may not want to leave; even though no one 
has told me to leave.  Despite all the reasoning, I no longer feel like I belong here. In a way, explaining 
to me that the feeling of being alien comes from somewhere else, not because people would have 
been discriminative. The account is explaining to me why they do not belong anymore even though 
they would miss certain things from London a lot. Because missing these things would be worth it if 
instead of feeling alien one would feel at home. All these accounts above are also constructing 
resistance towards Brexit Britain by having a possible backup plan to leave. They are demonstrating 
to me that it is up to them whether they stay or not.  
“Just the uncertainty of me staying in this country and whether I want to stay. I love 
England, but it’s not the same country I fell in love with”  
” I no longer feel welcome or recognise the country where I first moved to work and study 
during the 1990s”  
These two accounts resist the uncertainty and unwelcomeness of current Britain. The first account 
stating that it is not the country one fell in love with. The second account by saying that Britain has 
become a place one no longer recognises. In a way, these two accounts illuminate the change Britain 
as a country has gone through, becoming a place one no longer necessarily even wants to stay in. I 
argue that distancing the country from what one used to know can, in a way, be understood as a 
coping strategy to deal with leaving it. Or at least making it easier to make the possible decision of 
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leaving. Thus, these two accounts construct a loss of belonging to Britain but also resisting identities 
to cope with this possible loss. 
“I saw the UK as a multicultural and welcoming country, far more than Finland. I felt like 
my potential future here had been taken away from me. My feelings have not changed 
significantly. I still don't know if me and my British partner want to live here long term” 
“I deal with it by knowing it’s not a forced choice: I’m here because I want to be. If this 
country becomes one I no longer want to be a part of, I will leave” 
Similar findings demonstrate how Britain has become a place that does not feel like home and where 
one is not welcome anymore. Above the two accounts construct strong resisting identities by using 
words such as I still don’t know if me and my British partner want to live here. In the second account, 
statements such as it’s not a forced choice, and I will leave, If this country becomes one I no longer 
want to be a part of, demonstrate a resistance. They are resisting because the accounts are stating 
that the potential leaving or staying is up to them. The first account is also, in a way distancing the 
UK as a country that has become less multicultural and welcoming. A place where one perhaps does 
not even want to live anymore.  
“Obviously I have a backup plan in case everything turns upside down and they do decide 
to start kicking people out. But I haven’t really experienced any form of racism or 
exclusion for being an EU citizen” 
 “I felt betrayed by the Brexit vote, like I was no longer welcome and like the public had 
shown a side to itself I never imagined possible. Brexit was a strong driving force behind 
my leaving Britain to come back to Finland after over a decade living there” 
In the former account, the word use obviously having a backup plan states that exclusion is a real 
threat for an EU citizen, for there is a fear of being kicked out. The account makes a division 
between they (probably the British decision-makers) and people (assumedly EU citizens). In result, 
the account others negatively against the British who may start kicking people out. Even though the 
account states not having experienced racism or exclusion for being an EU citizen, a backup plan has 
been made. The backup plan here demonstrates an identity of resistance. Nevertheless, also that 
there is still hope and belonging has not necessarily been lost but only shaken.  
 
From the data, five respondents stated that they had already left Britain during the data gathering 
in January. The latter account demonstrates how Brexit became a reason one no longer wanted to 
stay in Britain, even after over a decade living there. Although leaving the country could be analysed 
as a total loss of belonging to Britain, it is also constructing a resistance as shown in the earlier 
accounts. One has decided to move back to Finland due to the Brexit vote and perhaps through that 
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search for belonging from Finland.  I find it essential that even respondents who at the time of data 
gathering were not living in Britain anymore took the time to answer my Brexit-questionnaire. 
Brexit, which does not mean anything yet, has so much meaning to so many.   
I have placed accounts which are either planning on leaving or have already left Britain as 
constructions of non-belongingness. However, the accounts with their use of discourse also 
highlight a way of taking up resisting identities. These accounts are perhaps accepting the situation 
for now but constructing resistance and no matter what take their future in their own hands. They 
have decided not to stay if they do not want to. I think this is a very empowering way of constructing 
identity as someone who has the strings of their lives in their own hands. Albeit, all the accounts 
above use language that constructs a strong resistance, next, I will demonstrate how people have 
different positions, and all decisions are not only up to them because of other people involved. 
Therefore, I am arguing that the non-belongingness discourse is also heavily influenced by other 
(meaningful relations) people’s presence or the lack of this presence.   
 “Regardless of what happens now, UK is likely to experience poverty, insecurity and 
violence not seen for a long time. I would leave if my young adult kids also moved. I am 
mostly angry I didn’t leave when they were small. But how was I to know…”  
 “As a nurse, I have experienced how many colleagues have returned to their homes in 
other EU countries and thus the workload is increasing. I would also very much wish to 
leave but the kids are here at home and their whole lives are in Britain” (translated by 
Np6)  
Even though people need meaningful relations for the sense of belonging, these meaningful 
relations can also put people into a more vulnerable position. Meaningful relationships might put a 
person to a place where one is not only responsible for oneself. Non-belongingness in the accounts 
here is a desire to leave Britain. Still, active resistance is difficult to take due to meaningful relations. 
Nevertheless, the first account does construct resistance towards the situation by stating 
that regardless of what happens now, UK is likely to experience poverty, insecurity and violence not 
seen for a long time, I would leave If my young adult kids also moved. In a way, the account 
demonstrates strong disagreement towards Brexit but being a parent is more important, which is 
also the reason one has not left Britain. Also, the second account constructs a parent identity where 
putting their kids’ needs is more important than leaving Britain, although stating a desire to leave 
like many of the colleagues. 
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In both accounts, meaningful relations are near as if blamed for being the reason one cannot leave 
Britain or why one cannot take an active resistance. The second account by stating I would also very 
much wish to leave but the kids are here at home. Thus, not everyone is in the position to leave nor 
take one’s own life in their hands even though belonging would have been lost. Although both 
accounts are resisting the current situation, the responsibility of being a caring parent is more 
important. Thus, the decision of staying is actually up to them, although it is a decision they 
demonstrate being unhappy with.   
 “I have a family here; I own a house and a piece of land. I have lost lots of friends last 
two years; they have moved back to Finland or other European countries. I feel I belong 
less now” 
Non-belongingness is also constructed through the loss of friends. Many accounts tell how the loss 
of friends who are often stated as being EU nationals, influence their belonging. For people to 
belong, meaningful relations are needed. Thus it is a clear explanation of why these respondents’ 
belonging has been challenged or even lost. Adding to this that people need different amounts of 
meaningful relationships, i.e. family might not be enough, but many also need friends to feel 
belonging. Especially the account above explains having all these things here: family, house and a 
piece of land, yet I feel I belong less now. First constructing a well-off identity, but due to Brexit, it 
has been challenged. Belonging has not necessarily been totally lost because of the construction of 
a well-off identity at first. Having a family, owning a house and a piece of land do refer to capital 
which may help to resist a total loss of belonging.  
 “British people are no longer as friendly towards other nationalities. I used to be proud 
to speak Finnish to my children, but now I feel I get angry looks etc”  
“I don’t really feel British, because the locals seem to treat me differently because of my 
accent. This has become more obvious after the Brexit vote”  
Here the first account describes a loss of belonging by categorising all British people as not being 
friendly towards other nationalities anymore. There is a division between British people and 
different nationalities that the account is categorising, stating that British people have been friendly 
before but not so much anymore. Speaking Finnish is a way to distinguish as the Other nationality 
(something else than the mainstream British) towards whom British people are no longer as friendly 
anymore. Here it is perhaps difficult to analyse an identity position; however, the division of all 
Britons as unfriendly towards other nationalities does categorise them as something negative. 
Something one perhaps does not even wish to be a part of. Thus, I have chosen to present the 
account as constructing an identity of resistance.  
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The latter account constructs a loss of belonging through the assumption of locals seem to treat me 
differently because of my accent, and I don’t really feel British. The account is constructing an accent 
from somewhere else by othering the locals from oneself. The account is demonstrating that one 
does not belong as much with the locals. Also, one does not necessarily even want to be apart of 
them. The seeming treatment (which has become more obvious after the Brexit vote) from the 
locals is a reason one states not feeling British. Both accounts are constructing non-belonging but 
also resistance by categorising the British as less friendly towards other nationalities (which both 
the accounts are). 
“At times I don’t want to openly advertise being a foreigner”  
“Mostly racist behaviour that has risen towards foreigners living in the UK, I haven’t 
really made a bug number of being a foreigner and try to avoid the whole Brexit 
conversation”  
Similarly, as the previous account above the former account here is hiding one’s foreign nationality 
because it could be a reason to be categorised as the Other, someone not British. I have placed the 
account under the non-belongingness discourse because it is resisting Brexit by hiding their 
nationality by not openly advertising being a foreigner. Hiding one’s own nationality could be 
perceived as a coping strategy towards dealing with living in Brexit Britain. In a way, though, hiding 
one’s nationality may be seen as a way to legitimately belong more, which could be seen as a sign 
of resilience. Nevertheless, I argue the account is constructing more a loss of belonging due to 
categorising oneself as a foreigner. Because if foreigners should hide their foreign nationality, they 
have also had to renegotiate their own belonging.   
 
A way of dealing with the increase of racism toward foreigners is not to advertise being a foreigner 
as also done in the latter account, however; still categorising oneself as one. Both of the accounts 
through language construct identities of resistance. Perhaps to cope with a loss of belonging due to 
Brexit. Similarly, the accounts could be seen as constructing resilient identities, being able to hide 
their nationality to be able to belong more among the mainstream.  
As shown above, the function of the non-belongingness discourse is the construction of a loss of 
belonging to Britain. Yet also an identity construction of resistance in some form.  
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7.2 Active Exclusion  
I have categorised active exclusion as the discourse that potentially constructs the strongest loss of 
belonging, however not necessarily. Active exclusion is here understood as discriminative or 
exclusive behaviour, for example, through racist comments. Many of the Finnish participants state 
that either they have heard racism has increased towards foreigners, or they report that they have 
experienced it themselves. Contrary to the non-belongingness discourse, the function of active 
exclusion is not to take up identities of resistance but rather to construct hopeless identities. 
“The day following the referendum I got wished happy Independence Day. It was 
surprisingly hurtful” 
“I have been told to go home”  
The accounts above demonstrate the importance of context in analysing people’s discourse use. In 
a different context, the first account might be surprising or at least raise questions; why would one 
state feeling hurt after being wished happy Independence Day? Here the Brexit Referendum which 
has been constructed as a British only matter; happy Independence Day refers to exclusive language 
against those who do not identify as British. Thus the account seems to be constructing an identity 
different from a British, for it is someone else’s nationality that is being celebrated. Even though 
wishing happy Independence Day is not usually directed in a racist or discriminative way, in here it 
is exclusive and through that may cause active exclusion.  
 
The latter account could be analysed in a very different light if it was a sentence used by a kid at the 
playground, stating that s/he needed to go home for dinner. Nevertheless, I have been told to go 
home as a response to my Brexit-questionnaire notes that home means the place the respondent is 
from. Which in this case is most likely Finland, although, Britain is most likely their home nowadays. 
Thus, I have analysed it as discriminative or even racist behaviour. Both accounts are short in length 
and thus analysing identity again is not perhaps adequate. Nevertheless, both statements could be 
understood as constructing a hopeless identity, for neither one is taking up a resistance nor 
resilience.   
“I felt unsafe, I felt naive for in having thought I was welcome. I felt ashamed that 
I hadn’t ever fully grasped what it was, emotionally, to be marginalised, ostracised, 
abused even” 
This account is constructing a somewhat bitter identity by stating I felt naive in having thought I was 
welcome, as if not deserving to be appreciated. As if to be marginalised, ostracised, abused 
even, were the norms, supposedly for someone, not a native Brit. Thus, the account is both 
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constructing a loss of belonging and a hopeless identity, someone who should not (at least anymore) 
think of being welcome to Britain.  
“I feel Finnish and in pre-Brexit England that makes me feel like an outsider” 
”I feel like an outsider. I never felt like that until the morning of the Brexit results and 
every day since. I can pay taxes until I retire and contribute to society, but I will always 
be foreign” 
“I used to [feel British], since the Brexit decision I’ve felt people see me as a foreigner” 
This first account constructs a loss of belonging through one’s own national (Finnish) identity, which 
is not the mainstream British identity but an outsider. The use of outsider refers to a sense of non-
belonging to Britain, for belonging is about feeling at home. The second account also constructs an 
outsider position by categorising oneself as an outsider and as a foreign national. The account states 
that one has never felt like an outsider before the morning of the Brexit results, and every day since. 
Seemingly though not lost all belonging as still stating to continue to pay taxes and contribute to 
society. Nevertheless, there is deep frustration in the tone of the account; as if no matter what s/he 
does, s/he will always be foreign and being foreign (in this case) means to feel like an outsider.  
 
The latter account states that they used to feel British, but Brexit challenged this, and now I’ve felt 
people see me as a foreigner. Here an exclusion to being categorised as a foreigner has lost the sense 
of Britishness. Instead of being part of their (the British) group, they are foreigners. Interestingly 
some categorise themselves as a foreigner which they hide in terms of being able to cope or belong 
better and others construct non-belonging due to not wanting to be labelled as the foreigner. All 
the accounts above construct hopeless identities because there seems to be little they can do in 
their positions against their non-belongingness.  
“I do worry more. And I do hear people being more negative about migrants” 
“I don’t feel as welcome anymore, however I have not experienced racism yet” 
These two accounts above demonstrate how external discourses and other people’s discourse use 
has affected the construction of these discourses. Because many others have reported that they 
have experienced racism, one reports a worry to experience it also. The former account could be 
constructing an identity that is something else than a migrant, and for this reason, people have not 
been negative towards oneself. However if the two sentences of the discourse are changed places: I 
do hear people being more negative about migrants, I do worry more, it would perhaps be more 
clear that constructing oneself as a migrant (towards whom people have been more negative) is the 
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cause of worry. I have analysed the discourse as latter explained and thus see it as a construction of 
active exclusion with a construction of a hopeless identity more than anything else.  
 
The latter account with language such as I don’t feel as welcome anymore constructs a loss in 
belonging, however I have not experienced racism yet, highlights that an experience of racism is 
likely to happen. Perhaps because so many others have also experienced it or because the news has 
talked about it. Then again, as the aim of discourse analysis is not to go beyond the text, the account 
could also use such discourse to demonstrate how they should not perhaps feel that unwelcome 
because they have not felt racism nor believe they will. However, the word use yet does refer to 
possibly experiencing racism at some point or having worry about it. Thus, I argue, the account is 
most likely constructing a hopeless identity.  
”--the referendum took place on a Thursday night, and already on Saturday morning I 
was a ‘fucking foreigner’ in my home village. You could definitely feel the approval of 
looking down at foreigners ever since”  
 
“I felt like Britain changed overnight. Suddenly British people started throwing rocks and 
spitting on foreigners on streets and hate crime increased. I was told at work that I only 
have a job because I tick a box by being an EU citizen as the company has to employ 
foreigners to be seen as a diverse organisation. I felt that after a decade living and 
working in London, I was no longer welcome”  
Some of the Finnish participants report that they have experienced direct discrimination, exclusion 
and racism personally themselves, which has potentially affected their belonging, although not 
necessarily. Above both of the accounts demonstrate the Referendum result’s timely uniqueness in 
influencing people’s discourse use. The referendum took place on a Thursday night, and already on 
Saturday morning, and I felt like Britain changed overnight. 
  
The first account states having experienced active exclusion by being categorised as a fucking 
foreigner in their home village.  The account constructs a hopeless identity, someone who 
demonstrates an experience of active exclusion without pointing fingers at anyone. In the second 
account, all British people are being constructed as becoming hostile towards foreigners. The 
account is constructing a foreign identity (specifically EU citizen) and through that states not feeling 
welcome in London anymore, even, after a decade living and working there. The account reports 
having experienced active exclusion by being told to have a job only for the company to be seen as 
a diverse organisation. The account also constructs a hopeless identity.  
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”Being a white middle class woman from a Nordic country, I have faced very little 
discrimination. After Brexit I finally know what it’s like” 
The account above constructs first a privileged identity as a white middle class woman from a Nordic 
country which has seemingly protected from facing discrimination before Brexit. After Brexit I finally 
know what it’s like could in a different context be analysed as something positive as often the use 
of finally refers to something positive one reports wanting to have experienced for a long time. 
However, in this case, I have analysed the account as more a construction of frustration and 
hopelessness because it is linked to discrimination. Whiteness, middle class or even someone from 
a Nordic country can be understood as adjectives used to construct a well-off migrant identity, yet 
even this status has not protected from being actively excluded in the world of Brexit through 
discriminative behaviour. In result, the account is constructing a loss of belonging through a 
hopeless identity.  
 
The discourse on active exclusion emphasises that the political and other people’s discourses have 
potentially had an influence on these discourses but also that Finnish people state that they have 
experienced active exclusion in Brexit Britain. Active exclusion constructs a loss of belonging and a 
passive hopeless identity. 
 
7.3 Othering  
A large part of the data consists of people who have lived in Britain for many years and state not 
being that concerned over their own lives in Brexit Britain. However, many are worried about the 
lives of Others. This could be explained through a person’s need to belong, and 
perhaps othering Others as less belonging from oneself could secure one’s own sense of belonging. 
Yet, the accounts through their privileged position are also able to construct caring identities. Some 
respondents say they have been othered from the mainstream for example as foreigners or 
migrants as noted in the non-belongingness and active exclusion discourses. In contrast, some of the 
respondents use othering to construct a stronger sense of their belonging to Britain. For instance, 
they are identifying themselves as people with a desirable identity and different from other foreign 
nationals. Hence, I claim that being othered can construct a loss of belonging and vice 
versa othering can construct belonging. Accounts that I have placed under the othering discourse 
state how they take the strings of their own lives in their hands. They can belong more and also 
construct resilient, often well-off identities. 
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 “I immediately felt unwanted in the UK after the results of the referendum, and 
this feeling has worsened as the Brexit negotiations have been unfolding. I dealt 
with the genuinely anxiety inducing uncertainty - at that point after 20 years of 
living in the UK - by immediately applying for British citizenship (a process which 
isn't easy or cheap by any means). I had mixed feelings about doing this but 
reasoned the decision in that my entire life is here, and I did not want to live in 
uncertainty as this was affecting my mental health. I realised I was in a very lucky 
position financially to be able to do this. And it has also finally given me a voice in 
that I am now able to vote” 
“I am in the process of applying for citizenship, which is expensive and hard.  I do 
this so I can be sure I can stay here with my child” 
Many of the respondents had their whole lives in Britain, and for them, there was perhaps no other 
option than to stay no matter what happens with Brexit. For these respondents moving out may not 
be a position they are willing or even capable of taking. In result, some had found another way 
through applying for citizenship or settled status. Nevertheless, applying for citizenship or settled 
status does not necessarily mean belonging more because belonging is more than just formal rights. 
However, it could potentially construct a stronger belonging to Britain by getting access to all legal 
rights even if Britain was to withdraw from the European Union. 
The first account demonstrates that applying for British citizenship may ease anxiety and bring 
formal rights in Britain. The account does illuminate a worsened feeling of not being wanted in 
Britain. Yet, I have placed it under the othering discourse because I argue that a way of taking up a 
resilient identity is applying for citizenship (or, i.e. settled status). Applying for citizenship does not 
mean one will feel more belonging, yet the aim is this, and thus I argue it is more a construction of 
belonging than non-belonging.  
 
Both of the accounts explain the difficulty behind the process of applying for citizenship. 
Nevertheless, both are in a privileged position to do so. Having access to formal rights may also 
resist the possibility of otherwise being othered. In addition to having a resilient identity by being 
able to apply for citizenship, the second account demonstrates a parent identity. By stating I do this 
so I can be sure I can stay here with my child. The accounts are othering against those who are not 
in such privileged positions, for example, financially. However, there is no form of negativity behind 
it. 
“Not sure I’d say I feel British… But I certainly feel a sense of belonging, being part of 
something, part of this imperfect but in many ways good enough society”  
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“Less [feel British] than what I used to feel like prior to Brexit. Now I would describe 
myself European over anything else. I have started to think more about my ‘European 
identity’. Before Brexit I never thought about that at all” 
 
“It’s who I am, where I come from, after 20 years in Britain I feel as Finnish as ever. I feel 
at home here but I’m not British”  
For respondents who do not feel as though Finland (or any other country besides Britain) is a home 
for them anymore, it is essential to be able to sustain a stable position to Britain. Britain is home for 
these people even though not necessarily stating themselves as British. These accounts above 
construct belonging through multiple identities. The first account constructs a sense of belonging 
even though not necessarily categorising oneself as a Brit. The second account constructs belonging 
through a European identity for Brexit has challenged their British identity. Constructing a sense of 
Europeanness here seems to fill in the loss of belonging to somewhere else.  
 
The last account, most of all, demonstrates how one does not have to categorise as British yet may 
still feel at home there. The account is constructing a strong Finnish national identity stating 
themselves as Finnish as ever, even after 20 years in Britain. One does not have to report being 
British to be able to feel belonging there. One can also have many identities and feel belonging to 
many places. Thus, the above accounts above all construct belonging through multiple identities 
and also construct identities of resilience through having flexible ways of coping with a loss of a 
certain nationality by constructing a stronger nationality to something else.  
“Sucked, made me feel unwelcome. However, Scotland didn’t vote Brexit so this 
‘unwelcomeness’ applies more to other parts of UK”  
“London is different to the rest of England (and Britain). I don’t think Brexit will affect 
London that much, because London, I feel is a country of its own. However, I’m certain 
I’d be worried a lot more if I lived in rural areas, Wales for example” 
 “In London it is easy to be a foreigner, especially from Finland but some other parts of 
the country, EU people have experienced unpleasantness or hatred even”  
Scotland and London as discussed in subchapter 2.2 voted in favour of remaining in the European 
Union in the 2016 Referendum, whereas Wales voted to leave which is also a topic found from the 
data. The first account demonstrates how Brexit was a cause of unwelcomeness. However, because 
one lives in Scotland which didn’t vote Brexit, one does not need to feel less welcome there.  
 
The second account constructs London as a country of its own, and Wales as a rural area where one 
would be a lot more worried living in after Brexit. The last account also others some parts of the 
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country as places where EU people have experienced unpleasantness or hatred even. Contrary to 
London, where it is easy to be a foreigner, especially from Finland. Assuring one’s own residence 
area is not hostile towards migrants may, in a way, enable migrants to feel a sense of belonging 
there no matter what. Thus, here especially othering one’s own place as more accepting than some 
other areas is a construction of belonging, yet also a construction of a resilient identity by not 
allowing Brexit to affect them even though it potentially could.  
 
I argue that in some ways explaining one’s living area as less discriminative towards foreigners could 
be understood as a coping strategy. It is helping to cope with the outcome of Brexit, primarily if one 
categorises oneself as a foreigner and if Brexit is constructed (as I have done in this thesis) as anti-
immigration. I have demonstrated under the active exclusion and non-belongingness discourse 
how, for many of the participants, there is a real threat to face discrimination due to being foreign. 
As seen here under the othering discourse, many point out to living in more migrant-friendly places 
and thus state not having experienced any discrimination. Which could also be understood as a way 
of expressing that even though the political discourse has said racism is increasing, in one’s own 
area it isn’t. It legitimises that it is okay to live and belong there, even as a foreigner.  
 
It is important to add that not everyone who lived in London stated London to be a haven as seen 
in the former discourses on non-belongingness and active exclusion. Scotland was more clearly 
nearly always seen as a haven. However, because I chose not to include or analyse participants’ 
residence area, it is unclear whether everyone from Scotland stated belongingness rather than a 
loss of belonging.   
 “Racism has increased in smaller cities but where I live and in my circles, haven’t yet 
experienced any. Other more ‘visible’ immigrants have” 
The above account explains how one has been safe from racism not only because of one’s residence 
area but also due to not being a “visible” immigrant. The account categorises oneself as a less visible 
immigrant and thus reports not having experienced racism. As a result, the account is othering 
against more visible immigrants. Nevertheless, the use of brackets around the word “visible” does 
refer to the participant perhaps not wanting to other against “visible” immigrants yet does it 
anyway. Demonstrating how people can be very aware of their language use.  
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”I have thought rationally that there isn’t much they can do to me. I’m settled here with 
a Brit and own my home. I haven’t been worried about my personal circumstances. Some 
others who have not been in employment or are on state benefit worry me more” 
 “I think I’m safe, lived here for 22 years. But what about the others?”  
The first account above is othering against other people who have not been employed or are on 
state benefit. Additionally, the account explains a right to be in Britain by being settled there with a 
Brit and owning a house. The account highlights that there isn’t much that the assumedly 
mainstream Brits could do to take that away. Thus the worry is not personal, but it is for 
some others. Telling concern over others may in a way be constructing a stronger belonging. As in a 
way demonstrating that because others are in a worse off position, one should not worry over one’s 
own situation.  
 
The second account is also reasoning a belonging by stating that living in Britain for 22 years will 
assumedly be enough to feel safe; however, the worry is about the others. Although the accounts 
are othering, they are also constructing resilient and caring identities which emphasise 
that othering or categorisation as such do not have to be aimed negatively. Even though they may 
lead to, for example, exclusive or discriminative behaviour, these accounts are constructing both 
privileged and caring identities over the Others. 
“I honestly don't worry too much for myself. I think too many people are being hysterical 
about it, just because every now and then there is a lot of news coverage about someone 
who's lived here for 20 years being treated terribly by the Home Office. Overall I do 
believe that a normal citizen with a Finnish passport and higher education will do just 
fine. That’s not to say I don’t worry about others, which is why I don’t want Brexit to 
happen”  
“I’m not really worried because I think my Finnish nationality will play in my favour, 
whatever the outcome”  
For many of the respondents who explicitly stated having a Finnish nationality, Finnishness did play 
in their advance even though, i.e. not needing to live in Finland. Especially these two accounts 
construct a belonging through their Finnishness. Choosing to identify as a privileged Finn is, in a way, 
also othering against other nationalities. However, many did not talk about their Finnish citizenship 
at all (except when I had asked about it in the background questions). Being Finnish seems to play 
in favour for some of the respondents, however; as shown in the previous discourses above, not for 
all. Some had actively stopped speaking Finnish in public and in general, tried to hide being foreign. 
Thus, not for everyone, is Finnishness by no means a superpower. 
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The Finnish identity is constructed in the above accounts as a resilient survival identity. The first 
account states that a normal citizen with a Finnish passport and higher education will do just fine. 
Thus there is no need to worry personally besides over others. The second account also states that 
being a Finn will be an advantage whatever the outcome. In result, both accounts are building 
resilient identities and constructing a stronger belonging by othering those who are not Finnish. 
“I think the impact of Brexit will have less impact on opportunities for EU citizens 
such as Finns, but it may impact people form newer/poorer EU countries more. I 
worry for my British friends within EU and what their rights will be”   
Here the account categorises and others both against newer and poorer EU countries and also 
British friends within the EU. The othering happens by stating that newer/poorer EU countries will 
experience fewer opportunities than EU citizens such as Finns. Also, by saying that Brits within the 
EU might lose rights. Thus the account constructs both an older and wealthier EU national identity 
contrary to the poorer EU citizens. Yet also a privileged Finnish nationality who is in a position to be 
able to construct a caring identity, against the British friends who might lose their EU rights. The 
function of the othering is to demonstrate one will be fine in Britain and the EU even after Brexit. In 
result, here especially the account is constructing a strong, resilient identity through othering to be 
able to belong more. 
“The increase of visible racism Is angering. It’s unpleasant to admit, but as a someone 
with a certain level of income I’m less worried about my own status because I’m 
‘financially desirable’. I’m more worried for my parents, sister and her family” 
The account here demonstrates how people are careful with their discourse use and do not want to 
sound discriminative towards others by stating it’s unpleasant to admit. The account is less worried 
due to being ‘financially desirable’, highlighting it with the use of brackets, being more worried over 
the family. Hence, the account again constructs belonging and a privileged identity but also a caring 
identity. The account is also being aware of othering and trying not to do it although doing it 
anyway.  
 “Very pessimistic as EU citizens could not vote in it [the Referendum], yet we are an 
integral part of the British society” 
 “I was also angry about the injustice – for not being able to vote made me feel like a 
second class citizen. I felt it was really unfair that even after contributing to this society 
for 20 years (by paying taxes and volunteering etc), I had no say on the matter while 
someone in Australia, who had never paid a penny of tax in the UK or visited the country, 
was able to”  
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“I am still offended people I know voted to get rid of us, which was the main motivation 
for most Brexiteers. I have been paying taxes diligently while I personally know British 
people who live off welfare and don’t want to work voted to get rid of foreigners, who 
are apparently lazy”  
Here the accounts are above all othering the mainstream British and reasoning why they deserve to 
be in Britain even more than some Brits. The first account constructs a deserving EU citizen identity 
by categorising oneself as part of the EU citizens. EU citizens who are an integral part of British 
society, and that’s why it was very pessimistic they could not vote in the Referendum. The second 
account says being angry about the injustice - for not being able to vote even after contributing 
to British society for 20 years by paying taxes and volunteering. And yet they were not allowed to 
vote in the Referendum. The account is othering against British people who do not contribute to 
society, yet who were allowed to vote in the Referendum. The third account also constructs a 
desirable and deserving citizen identity by contributing to society by paying taxes, while personally 
knowing British people who live off welfare. These Brits had the guts to vote hard-working 
foreigners out. This account categorises us the foreigners and the Brexiteers as two distinct groups. 
 
 All the accounts above all demonstrate reasoning through othering why they specifically deserve 
and should be able to belong to Britain even more than some British nationalities because they are 
not a burden for the British society but quite the contrary, contributing to society in many ways. The 
accounts are constructing belonging, yet also identities of resilience and resistance, not accepting 
the current situation. These accounts are demanding justice, knowing they are deserving more than 
many Brits. They are showing resistance towards the situation and resilience due to the fact of being 
in such privileged positions.   
”I am in a position that I will be able to remain in the country. There are so many EU 
nationals alike myself, working age, not claiming benefits, paying my tax, with UK 
university degree and mortgage tied in this country, that I feel there is no threat that I 
would be denied my rights” 
“The least they could have done is assure the people who have been working and raising 
their families here that they are secure”  
These two accounts above also construct strong deserving identities. The first account constructs a 
deserving identity by building the discourse through being working age, not claiming benefits, 
paying taxes, having a university degree and mortgage tied to Britain. The rather keen awareness of  
their deservingness to stay is a sign of a resilient identity.  The second account constructs awareness 
of their deserving identity by categorising as a person who has been working and raising a family in 
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Britain. Thus they should be assured to stay. Additionally, the account is standing against the British 
decision-makers who should have assured people alike themselves are secure to remain in Britain. 
Additionally, the account is othering against those who have not been working and raising their 
families in Britain. A person who is deserving of staying is also deserving of belonging. 
 
To conclude, the function of the othering discourse is both to construct a belonging and a resilient 
identity. Sometimes also an identity of resistance. Some were taking up an identity of resilience, i.e. 
through applying for citizenship, having decided to stay no matter what. In contrast, others were 
taking up an identity of resistance by not staying which was demonstrated in the non-belonginess 
discourse. In a way, both constructing resistance, the other one through belonging to Britain and 
the other through non-belonging to Britain (and through that perhaps belonging to somewhere 
else). 
7.4 Deservingness   
The discourse on deservingness constructs an accepting identity and belonging to Britain. By this, I 
mean that someone else has in a way done the competence and othering process by stating that 
the respondent is deserving and wanted in Britain. The participants are not themselves othering but 
giving this responsibility to the powerful Others, which in this case is most likely always the British 
mainstream. The function can be either to distance responsibility to Others or to reason one’s own 
position through others, which was the case, especially with the previous othering discourse.  
 “The morning after the vote I felt like for the first time in 8 years that I was not wanted. 
Like I was a 2nd class human. I was feeling very low about the result although in my city 
the vote was to remain. My feeling has recently changed as I feel my kids will benefit 
from dual citizenship, and because my employer sent out a ‘we want you email to all its 
employees stating that they will pay all EU workers settled and pre settled status fees. It 
almost made me cry. I felt worthy again. And it is not about money – it’s about how it 
made me feel” 
I have placed the above account under the deservingness discourse because the employer had 
reconstructed worthiness. The account is telling a story from the morning after the Referendum. 
And stating a feeling of not being wanted anymore, to the moment answering my Brexit-
questionnaire, saying that feelings had recently changed. A severe belonging reconstruction was 
needed to feel worthy again. The account demonstrates how the employer’s email that stated all 
employees were wanted, brought forth worthiness again. Most of all, this shows how meaningful 
relationships and other people affect how we feel about our belonging to a specific place. Here, not 
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just the employer who sent a welcoming email and paid for all employees pre- settled status (that 
will enable to stay in Britain even after a no-deal Brexit) but also the kids who will benefit from dual 
citizenship. It is unclear whether the kids have gotten dual citizenship due to Brexit or whether they 
had it already before. Nevertheless, emphasising that the kids will be fine and free to move between 
the two countries (Finland and Britain) no matter what an outcome Brexit brings forth. In addition 
to constructing a belonging, the account is also building an accepting identity.   
“Lots of people say to me you will be fine as I’m in a good job and been here for a long 
time, but they don’t understand emotional stress and feeling of alienation that EU 
citizens here go through. I’m sad that my British partner will lose freedom of 
movement”  
This account tells how other people enable one to be fine no matter what happens with Brexit. One 
has a good job and been in Britain for a long time. Lots of people have 
constructed deservingness. The account constructs a deserving EU citizen status although stating 
that it is the Others (Lots of people) who have enabled this. There is a mention of a feeling of 
alienation as an EU citizen, but the last sentence I’m sad that my British partner will lose freedom of 
movement refers to a bigger worry over the British partner than oneself. The account constructs 
belonging through the reasoning of Others and an accepting identity, accepting what Others have 
said, although reporting not necessarily being completely fine with the overall situation.  
 “However due to the privilege that comes with being white and speaking English with 
almost no accent I often receive comments from British people (even colleagues working 
in healthcare) telling me how I am ok for an immigrant as I sound normal, am basically 
British, etc” 
 “I was a bit shocked to learn how some of my colleagues etc supported Brexit big time 
and how they wanted to close borders etc. When I questioned them about the whole 
immigration issue I always got told the same answer how I am ok, but it’s about all the 
Polish, Hungarian, Romanian and Russian etc people….”  
The first account begins by constructing a privileged identity for being a white person who speaks 
fluent English close to a native level. The account gives responsibility to the British people to enable 
one’s position as ok for an immigrant, who sounds normal. Sounding normal here refers to not 
having almost any accent and in the result being nearly British. Thus, the account is not deserving 
due to being Finnish, but due to being basically British. Also, it is the British people who have stated 
this deservingness. The account accepts being constructed by British people as a privileged 
immigrant. Even though the account began by constructing a privileged identity as being white and 
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speaking English with almost no accent, the responsibility of othering was given to the British 
people. 
 
In the latter account, nationality has very likely played a role because of the categorisation of Polish, 
Hungarian, Romanian and Russian etc. people as not so ok migrants by the colleagues. The account 
is accepting the category as ok. However, the full stops at the end of the last sentence refer to 
disagreement with the colleagues’ comments. Both accounts above construct belonging and 
accepting identities.  
“It was a great shock. I felt so sad and felt like all of a sudden all the people around me 
might actually want to get me out of the country. It was weird at the same time, as I was 
in the hospital with my poorly daughter at the time and surrounded by immigrant 
doctors, nurses and other hospital staff, with only a small handful of British around me. 
Still, all of a sudden, I felt unwelcome. Especially as I am an immigrant living off benefits 
who hasn't been employed here ever. Not by her own choice though, but it doesn't 
diminish the fact that I sort of am a textbook example of what sort of immigrants are 
hated... On paper. On my face everyone is shocked and tells me they didn't want me out, 
even if they voted for Brexit” 
As stated above, timely uniqueness is evident in many respondents’ answers. Here the account 
seems to challenge and question the feeling of unwelcomeness even though surrounded by 
immigrant doctors, nurses and other hospital staff with only a small handful of British around her. 
Although surrounded by migrants like her, she still somehow feels different, excluded from the 
locals British. The account categorises oneself as an immigrant living off benefits and a textbook 
example of what sort of immigrants are hated. The account seems to be constructing an 
undeserving migrant. Yet, it is Others (everyone) constructing her as deserving and wanted in 
Britain, even though these Others voted for Brexit. The account is constructing herself as an 
undeserving migrant on paper, but Others are categorising her as a wanted migrant. Thus, the 
account constructs an identity of acceptance and belonging.  
 
Deservingness, as presented above, is a discourse which constructs belonging and an identity of 
acceptance. The function is also to shred responsibility of the categorisation and othering process 
to Others who have in this case categorised the respondents as deserving. Next, I briefly combine 
my empirical findings with previous research and studies introduced throughout the thesis. 
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8.Discussion 
The aim of this thesis has been to examine the different belonging and non-belonging discourses 
Finnish nationals constructed when answering my Brexit-questionnaire in January 2019. The four 
discourses I found from the data were non-belongingness, active exclusion, 
othering and deservingness. As stated earlier, with an analytical discourse analysis I was able to find 
discourses from the data that emphasised a loss of belonging to Britain due to Brexit but also 
discourses that demonstrated a feeling of being welcome in Britain even with Brexit. The use of 
discourse analysis demonstrated how the study participants used language to make things happen. 
Additionally, the Finnish participants constructed identities with different functions which are not 
fixed but changing and under reconstruction all the time. 
The data indicated how the Finnish respondents talked about a disruption in their belonging due to 
the 2016 Referendum result, similarly as in the findings from the study by Guma & Dafydd Jones 
(2019), who had interviewed different EU nationals living in Wales. Especially the non-belongingness 
and active exclusion discourses constructed some form of a loss of belonging to Britain. 
Nevertheless, many did not state any kind of disruption in their belonging which was illuminated 
especially in the othering discourse. Participants who used othering explained and reasoned a right 
to belong, for example, by having a job or due to having lived in Britain for 
years. Deservingness and active exclusion were discourses through which respondents constructed 
accepting and hopeless identities. Other Brits had categorised the respondents to either deserving 
migrants or as undesirable foreigners who should go home. The function of 
the deservingness discourse was to construct a sense of belonging.  
Based on the questionnaire data the study participants used their language in different ways to 
construct identities of resistance and resilience to cope with the disruption in their belonging due 
to Brexit or to demonstrate that no disruption had been made, i.e. either by leaving the country or 
applying for citizenship, which were evident in the non-belongingness and othering discourse. The 
participants also categorised themselves in different ways either othering or categorising 
themselves from the other foreign nationals or the mainstream British people. Some of the 
participants stated having experienced discrimination and built hopeless identities, yet others 
reported being categorised as deserving by the Brits and would construct identities of acceptance.  
The discourse on non-belongingness includes language that constructs a loss of belonging, such as 
accounts that report wanting to leave Britain or losing friends who have left Britain. After the 
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Referendum result, many EU nationals did leave Britain, which is known as the Brexodus. Brexodus 
is also evident from my data for some had either left themselves or had EU national friends leave, 
many were planning on leaving. Losing friends that have returned to their origin countries, have for 
some of the Finnish respondents made Britain feel less like home, less belonging. I explain this by 
people needing meaningful relationships to be able to fit in and have a sense of belonging 
(Baumeister & Leary 1995, 497). Even though leaving or planning on leaving demonstrates a loss of 
belonging to Britain, it can also be seen as taking active resistance. Respondents who took power 
into their hands by deciding to leave if belonging was too shaken, were constructing non-
belongingness but also identities of resistance. However, not everyone from the data was able to 
leave even if they reported a desire to, for example, due to their meaningful relations such as kids 
who had their whole lives in Britain. Similarly, vulnerable groups were recognised in the data of 
Guma & Dafydd Jones (2019) as people to whom onward migration is not possible due to health or 
family reasons. 
The discourse on active exclusion above all constructed a loss of belonging to Britain through 
accounts that stated experiencing racist and discriminative behaviour. More often respondents 
stated that they had heard someone else had experienced racism or exclusive behaviour. I placed 
active exclusion as a discourse through which accounts did not construct strong resisting identities 
but in contrary built hopeless identities. As outlined in section 2.3.1, after the Referendum result, 
hate crime and post-referendum racism had increased towards anyone seemingly a stranger or an 
outsider (Komaromi 2016; Virdee & McGeever 2018). No one said that their Finnish nationality was 
a reason to experience racism. Still, their foreign nationality was something they did not want to 
advertise but instead hid due to the fear of exclusion. Thus, especially the discourse on active 
exclusion demonstrates the power political and media discourses have in influencing people’s 
discourse use. I placed active exclusion as the discourse that potentially leads to a total loss of 
belonging; however, not necessarily. 
The discourse on othering includes accounts which built resilient identities to belong more to 
Britain. Similarly, as Johnson et al. (2004) and Rodin (2016), in their studies, illustrate, othering was 
very evident from my data also. We may feel a loss of belonging when we are ourselves othered. 
Still, in terms for us to feel more belonging, we may be othering the Others ourselves. (Jones & 
Krzyzanowski 2011, 47.) A majority of the Finnish respondents had lived in Britain for over five years, 
still stated feeling a disruption in their belonging due to Brexit. Nevertheless, many were also 
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constructing a stronger sense of belonging through othering and reasoning why they specifically 
weren’t that worried over Brexit. Instead, they were concerned over some Others who weren’t, i.e. 
working or highly educated. Othering Others for these respondents reasoned their own belonging 
to Britain because there were people in worse off situations. The accounts on othering often 
constructed belonging detriment to the Others, however not necessarily in a negative light. 
 People distinguish each other between different categories, between themselves as belonging and 
distinguishing between Others who they see as not belonging, which may result 
in othering between groups (Boreus 2016, 419). Nevertheless, othering does not have to be 
negative or extreme (cf. Hall 1997, 235; Reicher & Hopkins 2001, 34; Boreus 2016, 419). Especially 
the Finnish participants who used othering were often constructing worrying and caring identities, 
stating that the worry of Brexit was above all towards the more vulnerable people.  
 Multiple identities presented earlier by Anthias (2006) was also a form of othering some of the 
Finnish participants used in their accounts to construct belonging. One does not have to feel British 
in terms of belonging or feeling at home and vice versa. One can also feel both British or Finnish or 
European and still feel belonging to Britain or any country one is living in. For some applying for 
citizenship helped to belong to Britain, however, because belonging is more than just citizenship 
(Anthias 2006, 21 – 22), it was not enough or even a solution to everyone. Applying for citizenship 
is also taking resilience so that one would not be othered due to having access to formal rights, just 
like the mainstream Brits.  
Participants of the study took different positions and identities to, for example, construct stronger 
reasoning and belonging to Britain, i.e. through othering other migrants or British people and in a 
way creating a deserving migrant identity. Othering one’s own residency as accepting or open-
minded towards foreigners in this study is also a way of legitimising one’s own reasoning and 
belonging to Britain. It was very clear from the data that participants who lived in Scotland or London 
often stated how their areas were different from the rest of Britain. These areas were open-minded 
and accepting towards foreigners, being areas that had voted to remain in the European Union.  
From the data, nationality played a role for some but not for all. Many respondents had lived away 
from Finland for a long time (some even most of their lives) and did not feel like home there 
anymore. Thus, many did not mention their Finnishness unless when I had asked it in one of the 
background questions (q4). Nevertheless, for some being Finnish played in their favour. For these 
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respondents, the national identity they said was the reason they would be fine in Britain even after 
Brexit. Often those respondents who categorised themselves as Finns, found the power in their 
Finnish national identity to reason their being and belonging. In contrast, respondents who 
categorised themselves as foreigners or immigrants, in general, reported more likely a disruption in 
their belonging. Nevertheless, the data also included accounts who were cautious and avoided 
speaking Finnish in public. In my data probably respondents who don’t dare speak Finnish in the 
streets or don’t want to promote being a foreigner actively may be promoting their normalness to 
be able to fit in, as presented by Jensen (2011).   
The discourse on deservingness is also a discourse through which accounts were not constructing 
strong resisting or resilience identities but contrary, took up identities of acceptance. Above all, the 
deservingness discourse includes language where the participants stated someone else had 
constructed the participant as deserving to stay in Britain. The participants were not themselves 
categorising as deserving but instead accepting what they were met with. Demonstrating how other 
people reason these participants specific right to stay and belong to Britain. In a way, this can be 
seen as a way for the participants to shred responsibility to Others so that they themselves would 
not other. In the study by Huot et al. (2016) migrants were constructed as deserving with skills, 
whereas asylum seekers were constructed as the undeserving, lacking these skills. Similarly from my 
data, respondents were constructed through an external Other as deserving. However, it was not 
necessarily a case of nationality but, i.e. a case of living in the country for long or having a job.  
The study illuminated how the uncertainties of Brexit have also affected Finnish people, not just 
Eastern European (Tyrrell et al. 2019) such as the Polish (Rzepnikowska 2019) or Italian nationals 
(Zontini & Pero 2019). As stated, belonging is not static but everchanging, and for us to belong, 
someone else may be excluded, however not necessarily. The data indicated that Brexit is an 
abstract phenomenon with very diverse significations for different individuals. In its most 
straightforward meaning, Brexit (Britain exiting the EU) has not happened yet, nonetheless still 
affects the lives of millions of people for better or worse. I hoped to demonstrate the power of 
discourse, which is not only about describing but actively doing, being timely, historical and 
contextual. Thus, we must not take discourses for granted but rather be careful in the way we use 
them. We must bear in mind that the process of inclusion may also create exclusion which may 
affect one’s sense of belonging. Which is, after all, a fundamental human need (Maslow & Frager 
1987; Baumeister & Leary 1995).  
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Overall the findings conclude that even people in seemingly similar situations constructed belonging 
discourses in Brexit Britain in their own ways. Above all, the use of discourse analysis helped me to 
distinguish different belonging discourses the respondents built. Thus, I believe discourse analysis 
has suited well as the method of analysis for this study. The data of this thesis has revealed how 
differently Brexit has affected people’s lives and especially Finnish people’s belonging to Britain.  
Lastly, the discourses I found mustn’t be understood as any objective truths but as my social 
constructions. Someone else might have found different discourses from the data. The aim was not 
to find an exclusive truth about Brexit from the beginning denying there is one. I am instead 
accepting that people have different views and ways of speaking about Brexit. Because language is 
not stable but everchanging, so are these discourses. Also, the constructed identities may change 
just the way people present a different position and identity in different situations to different 
people (Burr 2015, 143). In this case, I analysed Finnish respondents’ answers to my Brexit- 
questionnaire. Thus the outcome of the analysis must also be understood as a result of specific 
research, during a particular time in a certain culture. 
9. Conclusion 
Lastly, in this Chapter, I wish to both ponder some ethical considerations and limitations of this 
thesis as well as give suggestions for further research. 
 Objectivity is always an essential goal of doing research. It is something we aim for yet can never 
achieve. As this thesis is broadly based on social constructionism, I must include some ethical 
considerations among objectivity. Social constructionism regards objectivity to be impossible 
because it would imply for us humans to step outside of our humanity and view the world through 
no position at all. Instead, everyone sees and experiences the world from a perspective or another. 
We all stand somewhere, asking certain questions, using specific theories and assumptions. Thus, 
instead of aiming for full objectivity, researchers must recognise their positions with the topic and 
how it might affect the findings.  (Burr 2015, 172.) I acknowledge that I decided to approach Brexit 
through a certain perspective. My perspective surely influenced the way the Brexit-questionnaire 
was built, depending on what kind of participants took part in it. As grown fond of the topic, I do 
recognise that more ethical consideration concerning researcher’s position is needed.  
Primarily, the biggest ethical consideration I had to be aware of throughout this writing process was 
my position as a researcher with the topic and data. I am a non-British Finnish national myself, lived 
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in and out of Britain before and during this writing process. Thus, I have also been affected by Brexit. 
I do realise that already some of the questions I asked in my Brexit questionnaire (appendix 1) were 
guiding towards the problematic sides of Brexit.  Nevertheless, I believe my position as alike the 
respondents did play in my favour and helped receive such a rich and unique data. Since 2017 I have 
lived in Wales a couple of times and travelled all around Britain, never felt any kind of discrimination 
due to my background. This is just to demonstrate how big of a role the media has in influencing 
people’s discourse use, i.e. towards Wales as noted in the empirical findings Chapter (ch.7), which 
as an area had voted for Brexit. I have talked about Brexit mostly among Remainers but also some 
Leavers. It has been evident that people come from different backgrounds and through that have 
different reasons to vote for something or not to vote at all. I argue it has been crucial raising 
awareness of specifically the side-effects of the Referendum result from a Finn’s perspective, for it 
has mostly been missing. No one had yet conducted a study on Brexit merely through a Finn’s 
perspective, yet the number of responses in only a week highlight that there was undoubtedly a 
need for one. 
Accurately, the timely uniqueness of the data collection process needs to be emphasised and 
recognised. Never before in history has there been a situation in which a country has decided to 
leave the European Union, let alone negotiations on the further relations of the country and the EU 
have taken place. I am aware that Facebook, as a platform for data gathering, represents a selective 
sample of people (Valli & Aarnos 2018, 120). Nevertheless, qualitative study samples are if not 
always, most of the time somewhat selective. Additionally, not all Finns in Britain necessarily have 
Facebook, let alone are members of the noted above Facebook group. Also, not everyone, during 
the data gathering week, perhaps had time to answer my questionnaire. The Finnish embassy in 
London in 2019, estimates that over 20 000 Finns live in Britain (Finnish Embassy, 2019). Thus, even 
though the gathered data is rich, it must not be portrayed as a full representation of all Finnish 
people in Britain. 
I decided to construct Brexit as a result of right-wing populist rhetoric, and in a way perhaps I myself 
normalised EU nationals’ loss of belonging due to Brexit. Probably because of this, I also found 
articles where EU nationals belonging was on the agenda, to legitimise my work. Fortunately, I was 
able to see that there was another side to Brexit than just a loss of belonging, which was a 
construction of belonging. Someone else could have constructed Brexit as the only legitimate choice 
in making Great Britain great again. Without Brexit, I would not have experienced such a lively 
61 
 
writing process; neither would I have received such a unique data or written this thesis. Thus, if one 
were to analyse my own text s/he might find discourse use that in a matter of fact constructs positive 
aspects of Brexit. Even though I have and remain to strongly emphasise the uncertainty and 
problems Brexit has caused people, even to myself. 
Throughout the writing process, some of my British friends were concerned that the purpose of my 
thesis would be to ruin the reputation of Britain somehow. As if I aimed to say that foreigners are 
not welcome there by anyone anymore. I hope it is clear to the reader that this was not the aim by 
no means. Nevertheless, hearing these concerns has helped me to be more open-minded towards 
the topic. It has also helped me to listen to my data more carefully and not only see the non-
belongingness side of Brexit. Additionally, discourse analysis as a method has helped me to 
understand the bigger picture of Brexit as in the world of discourses Brexit is as real as any other 
phenomenon or concept. It has also helped me to accept and understand all the different Brexit 
realities people construct with their language use.  
Therefore, not only what we talk about but how we talk about is as important (Fine 1994, 70). As 
this is a discursive study, I have learnt to challenge my writing and wonder whether I am myself 
using exclusive or discriminative language.  I have had to be careful in my own language use as a 
researcher acknowledging for example that if I were to talk about Britain voting to leave the 
European Union, I would myself be excluding nearly half of the electorates who had voted Remain. 
Sometimes it was also challenging to decide which concepts to use to describe the questionnaire 
participants and EU nationals in general. I prefer to talk about EU nationals or EU citizens instead of 
EU migrants for the sake of the uneasy way migrants have been talked about in the media since 
the refugee crisis. However, the Brits are (still) also EU nationals. Thus sometimes, the use of EU 
migrant has felt like a better solution. My data, as well as some of the research I refer to have 
consisted of respondents with dual citizenship and thus using non-British EU nationals, has 
sometimes felt exclusive. However, as aimed to acknowledge throughout this study, categorising 
or othering need not lead to any forms of negativity, exclusion or discrimination. 
Brexit is an ongoing process of othering (Guma & Dafydd Jones 2019, 1) as well as a cause of both 
uncertainty and loss of belonging for both EU nationals and British nationals in Europe. Brexit has, 
in a way, become a construct that legitimises the mistreatment and discrimination of other 
nationals. Brexit has also brought into light the division of Britain. For this reason, I have chosen to 
speak of Britain instead of the United Kingdom (UK) as it does not seem that united at the moment. 
62 
 
Krumer-Nevo & Sidi (2012) aim to raise awareness in the essentiality of resisting othering in 
academic writing. They claim that knowing the Other is the strongest driver to do qualitative 
research. Nevertheless, knowing the Other may become a potential source of dominance, especially 
when there is a vast difference in social power between the researcher and researched. 
Acknowledging that when the participants have told the researcher their stories, it is the 
researcher’s way of writing and beliefs that have told their story. (Krumer-Nevo & Sidi 2012, 299.) 
The researcher holds the knowledge, received from former theories, respondents and other people. 
The participants’ answers may have built a data. Still, instead of their voice being heard in the 
research report, it is the researcher’s voice. (Burr 2015, 174.) Especially the analysis cannot be 
treated as objective but inevitably selective as already certain questions about certain social events 
have been decided to ask. An objective analysis would mean describing what there was in a text, 
without being biased by the analyst. (Fairclough 2003, 14 – 15.)  
 Thus, even though I have aimed to give voice to the Finnish respondents from my data, it is my way 
of writing, my chosen theories and my chosen perspective which has written the thesis. However, I 
do believe this is the closest to giving voice as possible. I also think that the gap between me and 
my data is not wide. Quite the contrary, I emphasise that this work has been dependent on the 
responses of the Finnish participants, realising that without them, this work would have never 
become a reality. I feel like I have been in a humble privileged researcher’s position. 
A need for further research on the topic is crucial; how is Brexit spoken among EU nationals now 
when Britain has been granted a new withdraw date to the end of January 2020? Have people grown 
numb or is the uncertainty more tangible than ever as Prime Minister Boris Johnson is determined 
to leave the EU with or without a deal. All these questions remain unanswered, and different people 
surely have different answers to them. Another important topic would be to continue to examine 
how British people are talking and experiencing Brexit and their belonging to Britain. Brexit is an 
ongoing process that still at the time of writing, in January 2020, has no official definition even 
though meaning so much to so many. I hoped to understand this mentioned process a bit more and 
thus chose to write my thesis about it. In conclusion, I have gained a lot of understanding of the 
reasons behind Brexit and the outcomes of it to different individuals. I hope the reader of this thesis 
has also learnt more of the so-called Brexit process. 
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Closing Words 
It is the beginning of February 2020, while I am writing these final words for this thesis. In the late 
evening on the 31st of January, Britain historically withdrew from the European Union. At the time, 
I was visiting Finland from Wales, just days before I was about to move to England. I stayed up 
following the Brexit countdown from both the Finnish and British news. Many were celebrating, yet 
many were also hurt and scared. Still uncertain how Brexit would affect EU nationals who are now 
under pressure of applying for a new status in Britain.  I felt sick to my stomach. It was the first time 
during this writing process I realised I am far from being an objective researcher. From social 
constructionism, I, of course, knew there is no such thing as an objective researcher. However, now 
I realised my position more clearly than ever. In fact, I could be analysing my own texts and get 
exactly similar results as the Finnish participants of my data. Brexit for me does not only mean my 
British family might lose their EU rights nor that all ‘my people’ in Finland could lose their British 
rights. Brexit for me also means that Britain could potentially be facing an increasing amount of 
problems, but so could the European Union. Additionally, Brexit for me means that right-wing 
populism won, rhetoric that excludes and categorises people into groups of deserving and less 
deserving.  
Leaving with Johnson’s deal means that a transition period remains till the end of 2020 during which 
nothing yet changes between Britain and the EU. During the transition period, Britain and the EU 
decide on the details of their future relations. Nevertheless, now there is no turning back, and Britain 
will definitely leave the EU, with more information to follow. Brexit marks an end of an era, yet also 
a beginning of something new and unknown. To conclude, I stand in a position I cannot run away 
from even if I tried, luckily, I wish not even to try to. 
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END NOTES 
1. A no-deal scenario: All free movement would end between Britain and the EU until otherwise 
agreed 
2. A deal: Determining under what circumstances Britain would leave the EU 
3. Article 50: Any member state may decide to withdraw from the European Union in 
accordance with its own constitutional requirements (European Parliament briefing, 2016) 
4. EEC: European Economic Community, former European Union founded by Germany, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, the Netherlands and France in 1957 (cf. Bomberg et al. 2012; 
Pinder & Usherwood 2013) 
5. Original version: ”Ennen rakastin Lontoota ja pidin sitä kotonani, nyt en tunne enää niin 
kuuluvani tänne. Jos muuttaisin pois, kaipaisin täältä tiettyjä asioita hurjasti, mutta pystyisin 
kuitenkin elämään ilman niitä, jos vaihtoehtona olisi, että tuntee asuinpaikkansa kodiksi eikä 
tunne olevansa vieras. Vaikkei kukaan minulle ole toivottanut hyvää matkaa pois täältä, niin 
en kuitenkaan ole enää yhtä juurtunut tänne” 
6. Original version: ”Sairaanhoitajana olen kokenut kuinka monet työkaverit ovat lähteneet 
takaisin koteihinsa EU-maihin, joten työtaakka vain lisääntyy. Kovasti haluaisin itsekin lähteä 
mutta lapset ovat täällä kotonaan ja heidän koko elämänsä on briteissä” 
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Appendix 2 – Cover text  
I put the questionnaire with a cover text as shown below on Facebook with my own personal 
account and full name on the 8th of January 2019.  
Heippa! Kirjoitan graduani Brexitiin liittyen Tampereen yliopistossa. Olen kiinnostunut Britanniassa 
asuvien (tai hiljattain asuneiden) suomalaisten näkemyksistä aiheesta. Jos sinulla on aiheesta 
sanottavaa, niin olisin todella kiitollinen, mikäli voisit vastata oheiseen kyselyyn joko englanniksi tai 
suomeksi! Aihe on todella akuutti ja ajankohtainen, joten kaikkien teidän vastauksenne ovat tärkeitä 
ja tervetulleita. Kyseluun vastataan anonyymisti ja vastauksia tullaan käsittelemään 
luottamuksellisesti osana graduni aineistoa eikä ketään voida tunnistaa niistä. Kyselyä saa jakaa! 
 
Hi! I am writing my master’s thesis on Brexit and the specific interest is in the Finnish people living 
(or have recently lived) in Britain. Whether you have anything to say about the topic, I invite you to 
answer the survey attached. You may answer the survey in Finnish or English. The topic is very 
current and thus all answers are very important and much appreciated. You will answer 
anonymously, and all data will be treated confidentially. If you know anyone who might also be 
interested in the topic, please invite them to answer too! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
